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I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Rules of Evidence, enacted by Congress and gov-
erning admissibility of evidence in federal trials since 1975, have had a
significant influence on the development of evidence law at the state
level. To date some forty-two states, including North Carolina, have
adopted evidence rules based on the federal rules.1 But adopting the
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research materials. A special thanks goes to Prof. Catherine Dunham for her insightful
comments and suggestions.
1. The following states have adopted evidence rules based on the federal rules:
Alabama, ALA. R. EVID. 101-1103; Alaska, ALASKA R. EVID. 101-1101; Arizona, ARIz.
R. EVID. 101-1103; Arkansas, ARK. R. EVID. 101-1102; Colorado, COLO. R. EVID.
101-1103; Connecticut, CONN. CODE OF Evib. §§ 1-1-10-6; Delaware, DEL. UNIF. R.
EvID. 101-1103; Florida, FIA. STAT. §§ 90.101-90.958 (LEXIS through Rev. Sess.
2005); Hawaii, HAw. REv. STAT. ANN. § 626-1, Rules 100-1102 (Michie, LEXIS
through 2004 legislation); Idaho, IDAHO R. EvID. 101-1103; Indiana, IND. R. EVID.
101-1101; Iowa, IOWA R. EvID. 5.101-5.1103; Kentucky, Ky. R. EvID. 101-1104;
Louisiana, LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 101-1104 (West, Westlaw through 2005 Reg.
Sess. Acts); Maine, ME. R. EVID. 101-1102; Maryland, MD. R. EvID. 5-101-5-1008;
Michigan, MICH. R. EvID. 101-1102; Minnesota, MLNN. R. EVID. 101-1101;
Mississippi, Miss. R. EVID. 101-1103; Montana, MorNr. CODE ANN. tit. 26, ch. 10, Rules
100-1008 (LEXIS through 2005 Spec. Sess.); Nebraska, NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 27-101-
27-1103 (West, Westlaw through First Reg. Sess. 2005); Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT.
§§ 47.020-56.020 (West, Westlaw through 2004 Spec. Sess.); New Hampshire, N.H.
R. EvID. 100-1103; NewJersey, NJ. R. EvID. 101-1103; New Mexico, N.M. R. EVID.
11-101-11-1102; North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rules 101-1103 (2003);
1
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same statutory language in an evidence rule does not necessarily mean
the state rule is the same as the federal rule. The admissibility of
expert testimony in North Carolina is a case in point.
In 1993, the Supreme Court held in Daubert v. Merrel Dow
Pharmaceuticals2 that Federal Rule of Evidence 7023 encompassed a
standard of relevance and reliability and did not adopt the prevailing
Frye4  standard. Subsequently, courts and commentators have
watched as the various states have construed their own versions of
Rule 702. Generally catalogued as "Daubert" states, "Frye" states, or
"other" states, commentators have attempted to chart the development
of the law of expert testimony across the United States. Because North
Carolina did not "adhere exclusively to ... Frye''5 and conditioned the
admissibility of expert testimony on the reliability of the scientific
North Dakota, N.D. R. EVID. 101-1103; Ohio, OHIO R. EvID. 101-1103; Oklahoma,
OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 2101-3009 (LEXIS through 2004 legislation); Oregon, OR. REV.
STAT. §§ 40.015-40.585 (LEXIS through 2003 Reg. Sess.); Pennsylvania, PA. R. EvID.
101-1008; Rhode Island, R.I. R. EVID. 100-1008; South Carolina, S.C. R. EVID. 101-
1103; South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 19-9-1-19-18-9 (LEXIS through 2005
legislation); Tennessee, TENN. R. EvID. 101-1008; Texas, TEX. R. EVID. 101-1009;
Utah, UTAH R. EVID. 101-1103; Vermont, VT. R. EVID. 101-1103; Washington, WASH.
EVID. R. 101-1101(LEXIS through 2005 legislation); West Virginia, W.VA. R. EVID.
101-1102; Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. 88 901.01-911.02 (LEXIS throughJuly 22, 2005);
Wyoming, Wyo. R. EvID. 101-1104.
The following states have not adopted evidence codes based on the federal rules:
California, CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1-1605 (LEXIS through 2005 Ch. 566); Georgia, GA.
CODE ANN. § 24-1-1-24-10-154 (LEXIS through 2005 legislation); Illinois, 725 ILL.
COMP. STAT. §§ 5/115-1-5/115-22 (LEXIS through Public Act 94-0241) (dealing with
criminal trials) and 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 5/8-101-5/8-2701 (LEXIS through Public
Act 94-0241) (dealing with civil trials); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-401-60-472
(LEXIS through 2004 supp.); Massachusetts, see R. MARC KANTROWITZ, MASSACHUSETTS
EVIDENCE FROM A TO Z, Appendix 1-1 Scope Note (2003) (reproducing a Dec. 30, 1982
announcement by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court rejecting a set of
proposed rules patterned after the federal rules); Missouri, Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 490.010-490.733 (LEXIS through 2004 legislation); New York, N.Y. C.P.L.R.
4501-4508 (McKinney 1992 & 2005 supp.); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-267-
19.2-271.3 and 88 8.01-385-8.01-420.6 (LEXIS through 2005 Reg. Sess.) (dealing
with criminal and civil trials, respectively).
2. 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (holding that FED. R. EvID. 702 requires proffered
scientific evidence to be relevant and reliable; acceptance by the scientific community
is only one factor to consider).
3. FED. R. EvID. 702.
4. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (holding that expert
testimony based on novel scientific methods would not be admissible unless the
underlying methods and principles were "generally accepted" within the relevant
scientific community).
5. See State v. Pennington, 393 S.E.2d 847, 852 (N.C. 1990).
[Vol. 28:1
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technique or methodology, 6 most such cataloguers considered North
Carolina a "Daubert" state.7 Even the North Carolina Court of Appeals
thought Daubert governed the admissibility of expert testimony in the
trial courts.8 The confusion was understandable. The language of the
North Carolina rule mirrored the federal rule, North Carolina never
adopted Frye, and nineteen years before Daubert the North Carolina
Supreme Court declared reliability the touchstone of admissibility of
expert testimony, not general acceptance by the scientific community. 9
Thus, placing North Carolina in the Daubert column seemed appropri-
ate. Courts, commentators, and cataloguers failed, however, to appre-
ciate the significant differences between the federal Daubert standard
for determining reliability and the standard routinely applied by the
North Carolina Supreme Court. The North Carolina Supreme Court's
recent decision in Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd. reveals those differ-
ences and clearly places North Carolina in the "other" category.1"
While the Howerton decision removed all doubt as to whether
North Carolina adopted Daubert's substantive standard, it did not
address how the North Carolina test for admitting expert testimony fits
within the broader context of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence.
Howerton also failed to explain how substantially identical language in
the governing rules and the same criteria of admissibility, i.e. reliabil-
ity, could produce such a different test. As a result, trial judges and
lawyers are left to apply Howerton to future cases without fully under-
standing the substantive and procedural foundation for the rule. The
resulting ad hoc development of the law in this vital area will likely
breed confusion and inconsistent results. This article will attempt to
reconcile the reasoning in Howerton with the rules of evidence and
explain the procedural and substantive differences between the federal
approach under Daubert and the North Carolina test applied in Hower-
ton. It will also suggest a change to the procedure courts use to deter-
6. See State v. Crowder, 203 S.E.2d 38, 46 (N.C. 1974) ("Scientific tests of this
nature [gunshot residue] are competent only when shown to be reliable.").
7. See, e.g., David E. Bernstein & Jeffrey D. Jackson, The Daubert Trilogy in the
States, 44 JURMETRICS J. 351, 358 n.41 (2004); Kenneth S. Broun, Daubert is Alive and
Well in North Carolina - In Fact, We Beat the Feds to the Punch, N.C. STATE B. J., Fall
2002, at 10, 10; Edward K. Cheng & Albert H. Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert Matter? A
Study of Admissibility Standards, 91 VA. L. REv. 471, 493 n.52 (2005) (noting that
North Carolina regards its admissibility standard as distinct from Daubert).
8. See Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 581 S.E.2d 816 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003); State
v. Bates, 538 S.E.2d 597, 600 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000).
9. See State v. Crowder, 203 S.E.2d 38 (N.C. Ct. App. 1974).
10. 597 S.E.2d 674 (N.C. 2004).
20051
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mine admissibility of expert testimony that will be more consistent
with the rules of evidence and the concerns of the court in Howerton.
Part II of this paper briefly describes the federal rule in order to
appreciate the context of the North Carolina approach to expert testi-
mony. Part III traces the development of North Carolina's expert testi-
mony law from the common law to codification in the rules of
evidence through the decision in Howerton and reveals that the North
Carolina test for reliability is, essentially, an evaluation of the credibil-
ity of the testifying expert. Part IV argues that Howerton's adoption of
a less stringent and credibility-based substantive test for reliability but
retention of the Daubert procedural "gatekeeping" role of the judge in
determining admissibility of expert testimony only partially addresses
the Daubert problems the Howerton court sought to avoid. I suggest
Howerton should have rejected the Daubert procedural paradigm and
treated the reliability of expert testimony as a matter of conditional
relevancy under North Carolina Rule of Evidence 104(b)" instead of a
preliminary matter for the judge under Rule 104(a),' 2 as does Daubert.
Part V concludes that treating the reliability of expert testimony as a
matter of conditional relevancy is supported by the language of the
North Carolina Rules of Evidence, furthers the policy goals that moti-
vated the court in Howerton to reject Daubert, and is consistent with
the factors traditionally applied in North Carolina to determine the
reliability of expert testimony. 13
11. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rule 104(b) (2003) ("When the relevancy of evidence
depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or
subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding of the
fulfillment of the condition.").
12. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rule 104(a) (2003) ("Preliminary questions
concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or
the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the
provisions of subdivision (b). In making its determination it is not bound by the rules
of evidence except those with respect to privileges.").
13. It is not my purpose to discuss the wisdom of rejecting Frye and Daubert in
favor of the more lenient Howerton substantive standard. My purpose is to examine
the procedural application of the Howerton standard in the context of the overall North
Carolina evidence code.
[Vol. 28:1
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II. EXPERT TESTIMONY IN FEDERAL COURT: THE DAUBERT STANDARD 4
Rule 702 governs the admissibility of expert testimony in federal
court.' 5 The first condition on the admissibility of expert testimony,
like the condition on all other evidence, is relevance. 16 The expert tes-
timony must have a "tendency to make the existence of any fact that is
of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or
less probable than it would be without the evidence."'1 7 While logical
relevancy under Rule 401 is required of all evidence, as discussed
more fully below, expert testimony requires heightened relevancy or a
more exacting "fit" to the facts of the given case than Rule 401
requires."
The second condition on the admissibility of expert opinion testi-
mony is the evidence must be from some scientific, technical, or spe-
cialized area that is outside the common experience and
understanding of the jury.' 9 If a jury could reach the same conclusion
14. For a comprehensive treatment of expert testimony in federal court see, 2
MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE §§ 701.0-706.2 (5th ed. 2001);
DAVID H. KAYE, DAVID E. BERNSTEIN & JENNIFER L. MNOOKIN, THE NEW WGMORE: A
TREATISE ON EVIDENCE: EXPERT EVIDENCE (2004); 4 JOSEPH M. McLAUGHLIN, WEINSTEIN'S
FEDERAL EVIDENCE §§ 701.01-706.06 (2d ed. 2005); 3 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD
C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE §§ 342-67 (2d ed. 1994); 3 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG,
MICHAEL M. MARTIN, & DANIEL J. CAPRA, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL
§§ 701.01-706.04 (8th ed. 2002).
15. FED. R. EVID. 702 ("If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion, or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is
based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable
principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods
reliably to the facts of the case.").
16. FED. R. EVID. 402.
17. FED. R. EVID. 401.
18. See infra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
19. FED. R. EVID. 702; see also United States v. Finley, 301 F.3d 1000, 1007 (9th
Cir. 2002) ("[For expert testimony to be admissible the] subject matter must be
beyond the knowledge of the average layman ...."); United States v. Brown, 7 F.3d
648, 652 (7th Cir. 1993) ("[B]ecause courts have recognized that the average juror is
unlikely to be knowledgeable about drug trafficking, they have consistently allowed
expert testimony concerning 'tools of the trade' and the methods of operation of those
who distribute various types of illegal narcotics.") (citations omitted). See generally,
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) ("When the question
involved does not lie within the range of common experience or common knowledge,
but requires special experience or special knowledge, then the opinions of witnesses
skilled in that particular science, art, or trade to which the question relates are
admissible in evidence.") (citations omitted).
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without the expert's opinion, the testimony is not helpful and does not
add anything the lawyer's closing argument could not supply.2 °
The third condition is the testimony must come from a witness
who is qualified by virtue of knowledge, training, skill, education, or
experience in the subject matter.21 The witness's expertise must be in
the area that is the subject of the proffered testimony. 2 While the
qualifications of an expert are given in the disjunctive and are not par-
ticularly onerous, courts will exclude the expert who fails to meet
these minimal standards.23
The fourth, and by .far the most contentious, condition of admissi-
bility of expert testimony is the requirement the testimony be relia-
ble.24 The current version of Rule 702 is a product of three Supreme
Court decisions: Daubert,25 Joiner,26 and Khumo Tire.2 7 Daubert
rejected the popular Frye "general acceptance by the relevant scientific
20. See, e.g., Wills v. Amerada Hess, 379 F.3d 32 (2d Cir. 2004) ("[E]xpert
testimony is unnecessary in cases where jurors 'are as capable of comprehending the
primary facts and of drawing correct conclusions from them as are witnesses
possessed of special or peculiar training."' (citations omitted)); Hibiscus Assoc. Ltd. v.
Bd. of Trustees of Policemen & Firemen Ret. Sys., 50 F.3d 908, 917 (11th Cir. 1995)
("Expert testimony is properly excluded when it is not needed to clarify facts and
issues of common understanding which jurors are able to comprehend for
themselves.") (citations omitted); Green v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 715 F. Supp. 1122
(D.D.C. 1989) (excluding plaintiffs expert from testifying on matters that should be
clear to "any reasonable person," can be argued by the lawyers in closing argument,
and for which special expertise is not needed).
21. FED. R. EVID. 702.
22. See Ralston v. Smith & Nephew Richards, Inc., 275 F.3d 965, 969 (10th Cir.
2001); Thomas J. Kline, Inc. v. Lorillard, Inc., 878 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1989); Devito v.
Smithkline Beecham Corp., No. 02-CV-0745, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27374 (W.D.N.Y.
2004).
23. Thomas J. Kline, Inc., 878 F.2d at 799-800 (excluding opinion testimony of
plaintiffs expert that defendant's actions amounted to unjustified credit and price
discrimination because the witness was not an economist and had no training,
experience, or education in anti-trust or credit and price determination); Ralston, 275
F.3d at 969 (excluding opinion testimony of plaintiffs expert-orthopaedic surgeon on
the subject of causation of intermedullary nailing); Devito, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
27375, at *26 (excluding plaintiffs expert pharmacist/nutritionist from testifying that
within a reasonable pharmacological certainty plaintiff was experiencing withdrawal
toxicity reactions from paxil: "Pharmacology can be fairly described as the study of
the effect of drugs on living organisms. Pharmacy, on the other hand, is the profession
of preparing and dispensing drugs.").
24. FED. R. EVID. 702.
25. Daubert v. Merrel Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
26. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
27. Khumo Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
[Vol. 28:1
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community" standard 28 and made clear the trial judge was the expert
testimony gatekeeper and must determine whether the proffered
expert testimony is reliable and relevant before admitting it.2 9 Joiner
held the trial judge was vested with discretion in deciding how to
determine reliability, as well as in making the ultimate decision to
admit or exclude expert testimony, and would be reversed only upon
an abuse of discretion.3 ° Khumo Tire applied the reliability require-
ment to all expert testimony, not just novel scientific testimony. 3 1
The Daubert gatekeeping function requires the court to make an
"assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the
testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or meth-
odology properly can be applied to the facts in issue."32 In conducting
this assessment, the Court set out the now famous "Daubert factors" to
guide the trial judge: (1) whether the theory or technique relied upon
by the expert has been or can be tested; (2) whether the theory or
technique has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) what
is the known or potential error rate of the technique employed by the
expert; (4) what standards exist that govern or control the technique's
or methodology's operation; and (5) to what degree has the theory or
technique been accepted or adopted by the relevant scientific commu-
nity.33 While each of these factors may not be applicable or useful in
every case, they serve as the primary, though not exclusive, factors
used by federal district judges in evaluating the reliability of proffered
expert testimony.34
In addition to the reliability requirement, the Court in Daubert
required the opinion testimony to "fit" the facts of the case.35 This
relevancy standard is more exacting than logical relevancy under Rule
401 and comes from the language in Rule 702 that requires the expert
28. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
29. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597.
30. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146-47.
31. Khumo Tire, 526 U.S. at 147-48.
32. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93.
33. Id. at 593-95.
34. See, e.g., Bourne v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., No. 02-1469, 2004 U.S.
App. LEXIS 1161 (4th Cir. 2004) (rejecting expert causation opinion in toxic tort case
based on Daubert factors); Scotts Co. v. United Indus. Corp., 315 F.3d 264 (4th Cir.
2002) (rejecting, without applying Daubert factors, expert testimony of consumer
confusion based on results of focus group survey as unreliable because focus group
survey was not conducted objectively); Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d
257 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding toxic tort causation opinion based on differential
diagnosis methodology that satisfies three of the Daubert factors is reliable).
35. 509 U.S. at 591-92.
2005]
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testimony "assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue. "36 Thus, in addition to logical relevancy
under Rule 401, expert testimony "requires a valid scientific connec-
tion between the expert's testimony and the pertinent inquiry before
the court as a precondition to admissibility. '37 This heightened rele-
vancy inquiry actually "incorporates a consideration of the Rule 403
dangers, particularly the danger of unfair prejudice. '38 Relevancy or
"fit" under Rule 702 "means that the expert's opinion must relate to an
issue that is actually in dispute .... -39 Logical relevancy, on the other
hand, does not require the fact to which the evidence is directed be
disputed.4 °
A fourth Supreme Court case, Weisgram v. Marley Co., held appel-
late courts had power to enter judgment against the verdict-winner
below, instead of remanding for a new trial, if the appellate court
found admission of the expert testimony was an abuse of discretion
and the record was insufficient to support the verdict when the expert
testimony was removed.41 When Weisgram is added to Daubert, Joiner,
and Khumo Tire it underscores the case-dispositive aspect of the federal
expert testimony standard. Failure to meet the exacting Daubert
admissibility standards often results in summary judgment.
III. EXPERT TESTIMONY IN NORTH CAROLINA STATE COURT: FROM
COMMON LAW TO HOWERTON'S RELIABLE AND
RELEVANT STANDARD
Since at least 1851, the North Carolina Supreme Court has recog-
nized the value of expert testimony to the judicial system.42 Admissi-
bility, referred to in the early cases as the competency of the testimony,
36. Id. at 591 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 702); see also Ruiz-Troche v. Pepsi Cola of P.R.
Bottling Co., 161 F.3d 77, 81 (1st Cir. 1998) ("Along with the reliability requirement,
the Daubert Court imposed a special relevancy requirement.").
37. Garlinger v. Hardee's Foodsystems, Inc., 16 F. App'x 232, 234 (4th Cir. 2001).
38. United States v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095, 1104 (7th Cir. 1999); see also 4JOSEPH M.
McLAUGHLIN, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 702.02[5] n.35-36 (2d ed. 2005) and
accompanying text.
39. Graham v. Playtex Prods., Inc., 993 F.Supp. 127, 130 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) (quoting
Margaret A. Berger, Procedural Paradigms for Applying the Daubert Test, 78 MINN. L.
REv. 1345, 1351 (1994)).
40. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997) (stipulation by defendant that
he had a prior felony conviction did not make evidence of the prior conviction
irrelevant in a prosecution for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon); see also
FED. R. EVID. 401 Advisory Committee's Note (stating "[tihe fact to which the evidence
is directed need not be in dispute").
41. 528 U.S. 440, 457 (2000).
42. See State v. Clark, 34 N.C. 151 (1 Ired. 1851).
[Vol. 28:1
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was conditioned upon the ability of the expert to form opinions based
on scientific or technical principles that were simply beyond the grasp
of jurors and judges. Competency of the testimony was determined by
the qualifications of the witness, not the underlying scientific reliabil-
ity of the opinion.43
A. The Common Law Competency Standard
State v. Clark44 typifies the early North Carolina approach to
expert testimony. Adam Clark was charged with shootirng and stab-
bing Eli Sigman and hiding his body in the woods of Person County.4 5
Witnesses who found Sigman's body, decomposed and dismembered
by animals, testified: "[T]he head was separated from the other parts of
the body, and ... the skin attached to the face and the throat under the
chin where it separated from the body presented a smooth and straight
edge .... 46
To prove that Clark murdered Sigman by cutting his throat with a
knife, the State called a surgeon as a witness. 47 The surgeon had not
personally examined the body, but had heard the descriptions of the
body given in court by the witnesses who did see it. The prosecutor
asked the surgeon if he could form an opinion from the description of
the body as to whether the skin of the throat under Sigman's chin was
cut by a sharp instrument or torn by animals.48 Defense counsel
objected and, during a brief voir dire, the doctor admitted he had never
read of or encountered a body that had decomposed for three months
and had been subjected to scavenging by animals. 49 Despite the doc-
tor's admitted unfamiliarity with determining the cause of wounds on
a badly decomposed and mutilated body like Sigman's, the trial court
overruled defense counsel's objection to the State's evidence.50 Clark
was convicted and raised the admissibility of the surgeon's testimony
as error on appeal.5 1
43. Id. at 151.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50, Id.
51, Id. The court noted the bill of exceptions did not contain the substance of the
doctor's testimony and, as a result, it could not determine whether the doctor's
opinion actually prejudiced the defendant. The court could have disposed of the
appeal on this basis but chose to address the admissibility of the expert's opinion
anyway. Id. at 152-53.
2005]
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In addressing the admissibility of the surgeon's expert opinion,
Chief Justice Ruffin first noted the difficulty confronting judges and
juries in deciding cases based on scientific or technical principles.52
He recognized the necessity of receiving testimony from "those who
made it . . . the business of their lives to study the principles of that
science . . . -53 In areas of scientific or technical knowledge, Chief
Justice Ruffin observed, the opinions of experts are "the best accessi-
ble evidence on the matters in issue; and when received, their weight
must deperd on the impression made thereby on those who hear
them. ' 54 Thus, admitting the surgeon's opinion concerning the vic-
tim's wounds was permissible because the surgeon was a man of sci-
ence, who had made it "the business of his life to study the principles
of that science. 55
In expanding upon this general principal, the court noted the role
of "science [is] to discover general principles from long and accurate
observations and sound reasoning, "56 while the court's role was to
seek justice. 57 Chief Justice Ruffin saw the relationship as a compli-
mentary one: the court was entitled to rely on the opinions of scien-
tists and other experts who could testify that the established principles
of their area of expertise were sufficient to allow them to form an opin-
ion.58 That a scientist had not examined the physical evidence of the
case, nor had experience with the precise question presented, went to
the weight of the opinion, not its admissibility.59
Chief Justice Ruffin's opinion commanded a strong following.
Nineteen years later, in Horton v. Green, the court relied upon Clark to
find error in the appellate court's exclusion of expert testimony.6 °
Horton's suit claimed the defendant sold him a diseased mule. The
trial court excluded the opinion of plaintiff's expert witness that the
mule plaintiff purchased was diseased at the time of sale. The witness,
Dr. Rivers, had practiced medicine for eleven years but was not a veteri-
narian, had not examined the mule at the time of the sale, had no
particular knowledge or familiarity with diseases common to mules,
and had never seen a case of the specific disease the mule in question
52. Id. at 154.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 153-54.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 155.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. 64 N.C. 64 (1870).
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allegedly suffered. 6 He testified, however, that from his "books,
observation and general knowledge of diseases of the human family,"
he could tell from the mule's symptoms whether the disease was pre-
sent at the time of sale.62 He testified that, although he had never seen
a case of glanders before examining this mule, "he was able to form an
opinion as to whether the symptoms of this mule indicated a disease of
recent or of long standing. '63 Noting the difference between diseases
in humans and animals goes to the weight of the testimony rather than
its admissibility, the court held that an opinion from a witness who
"has had peculiar means of forming an opinion by reading, reflection
and observation in the pursuit of a particular science, and [who] ... is
a physician of many years standing, and [who] . . . will swear that in
this way he has formed an opinion, it is competent evidence. 64
The early cases recognized that neither judges nor jurors were
equipped to determine whether a given scientific method, technique,
or principle was capable of answering the specific problem presented.
Rather, the judicial system relied upon those trained in these special-
ized areas to determine whether the given discipline, method, or prin-
ciple could answer the question presented; and, if so, provide the jury
with an opinion on the matter. By conditioning the competency of
expert opinion on the qualifications and credibility of the witness, the
courts deferred to not only the particular scientific community, but to
the individual expert. Once qualified as an expert by experience, skill,
knowledge, or training and swearing that his area of expertise could be
applied to answer the question before the court, the testimony was con-
sidered competent and the only remaining issue was how much weight
the jury would give the opinion.65
61. Id. at 67.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See generally, JOHN D. LAWSON, THE LAW OF EXPERT AND OPINION EVIDENCE 297-
98, 468 (2d ed. 1900) ("[T]he qualification of a witness to express an opinion.., is a
preliminary question for the trial court ... [but] [tihe opinions of ... experts are not
conclusive, but are to be weighed by the jury like all other evidence."); I GREENLEAF ON
EVIDENCE § 441k at 559 (1899) ("[Olpinions are receivable ... from persons having
special skill ... whenever that special skill enables them, better than the jury, to draw
inferences on the subject ..." and recognizing the jury's responsibility to weigh the
opinion and determine the existence vel non of the underlying facts or data.); HENRY
WADE ROGERS, THE LAW OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 197 at 444 (2d ed. 1891) ("For while it
is the function of the court to rule on the competency of witnesses and the
admissibility of evidence, it is a fundamental and well established principle of law that
the weight which is to be accorded to the evidence when admitted is a question that
lies within the province of the jury to determine.").
2005]
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B. The Competency Standard in the Twentieth Century
This uncritical and unquestioning deference to the expertise of a
given witness, as established by sworn testimony of the witness him-
self, persisted well into the twentieth century. For instance, when the
North Carolina Supreme Court first addressed the admissibility of fin-
gerprint evidence, it held that if the trial judge found that the witness
was qualified in his field of expertise and the subject matter was appro-
priate for expert testimony, the expert's opinion was admissible.66
Moreover, the determination of whether the witness was a qualified
expert was a "preliminary fact to be found by the trial court, and that
when there is any evidence to sustain such finding, it is conclusive on
appeal. '67 Thus, the finding of the trial judge that a given witness was
an expert determined the admissibility of the underlying opinion and,
for all practical purposes, insulated the issue from meaningful appel-
late review.
State v. Rogers illustrates the North Carolina Supreme Court's def-
erence to the sworn testimony of the expert in establishing admissibil-
ity of scientific opinion evidence.68 One of the issues in Rogers was the
trial judge's admission of expert testimony linking a bloody footprint
found at the crime scene to the accused. 69 The State's expert witness
used the ridge pattern comparison technique, commonly employed in
comparing latent fingerprints with known exemplars, to conclude the
footprints found at the scene matched those of the accused.7 ° In
reviewing the trial court's decision to admit this testimony, the court
noted this was an issue of first impression in North Carolina and had
not yet been addressed in any other state.7
The court began its analysis by reciting the qualifications of the
witness and noting that the trial judge had found the witness "quali-
fied to testify as an expert in fingerprinting and footprinting. '' 72 It
then noted the "well settled rule" that fingerprint evidence was admis-
sible to prove the accused's presence at the crime scene and that the
expert witness himself testified the ridge pattern on the sole of the foot
66. State v. Combs, 158 S.E. 252, 254 (N.C. 1931).
67. Id.
68. 64 S.E.2d 572 (N.C. 1951), rev'd on other grounds, State v. Silver, 213 S.E.2d
247 (N.C. 1975).
69. Id. at 575.
70. Id. at 577.
71. Id.
72. Id. The foundation testimony offered at trial consisted solely of a description of
the witness's training as a fingerprint analyst. Statement of the Case on Appeal to the
North Carolina Supreme Court at 40-42, State v. Rogers, 64 S.E.2d 572 (N.C. 1951)
(No. 951).
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was just as permanent and just as unique as the ridge pattern on the
fingers. 73 The court also took into consideration its own recognition
that "[i]t is a matter of common knowledge ... in the fields of crime
detection and medical jurisprudence that the permanence of the fric-
tion ridges on the sole of the foot makes a naked footprint a means of
identification. ' 74 Accordingly, the court affirmed the admission of the
footprint evidence.75
There is no indication in the court's opinion, however, that the
trial judge considered anything but the sworn testimony of the expert
witness in finding the evidence admissible.76 The court's reference to
"common knowledge" and its citation to treatises on criminal investi-
gation and medical jurisprudence merely confirmed the trial judge's
decision.77 Interestingly, the court did not specifically impose a relia-
bility test to the footprint analysis, since it was an extension of an
existing technique. Rather, the sworn testimony of the State's expert
who "testified with positiveness that the friction ridges on the soles of
the feet ... are as individual and permanent as those on ... fingers,
and that the technique used in identifying naked footprints is the same
as that employed in identifying fingerprints," was sufficient to admit
the testimony.78
Although the Frye standard prevailed in most jurisdictions at the
time Rogers was decided, the court did not cite or refer to Frye's princi-
ple that new techniques are not admissible until generally accepted by
the relevant scientific community. 79 Rather, the Rogers court's uncriti-
cal acceptance of the ipse dixit of the expert that the principles applied
to fingerprint identification are equally accurate when applied to foot-
prints defers to the expert witness himself. The noticeable absence of
any reference to Frye at a time when it was the prevailing view among
both state and federal courts, or to any other principled test of reliabil-
ity, reveals a trend toward a less rigid approach. This less rigid
approach allowed the witness to establish his own status as an expert,
73. Id. at 578.
74. Id. at 577 (citing ALFRED A. HERZOG, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE § 244 (1931);
CHARLES E. O'HARA & JAMES W. OSTERBURG, AN INTRODUCTION TO CRIMINALISTICS: THE
APPLICATION OF PHYSICAL SCIENCES TO THE DETECTION OF CRIME 112-14 (1949)).
75. Rogers, 64 S.E.2d at 579.
76. The foundation testimony offered at trial consisted solely of the witness's
training as a fingerprint analyst. Statement of the Case on Appeal to the North
Carolina Supreme Court at 40-49, State v. Rogers, 64 S.E.2d 572 (N.C. 1951) (No.
951).
77. Rogers, 64 S.E.2d at 579.
78. Id. at 577.
79. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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vested tremendous discretion in the trial court, and showed great con-
fidence in the jury to understand and appropriately weigh the evi-
dence, all with the protection of a deferential standard of appellate
review.
C. The Reliability Standard Arises
While deference to the sworn testimony of a qualified expert and
the virtual non-reviewability of the trial court's determination of the
expert's qualifications was the prevailing practice in North Carolina in
the mid-twentieth century, the issue of scientific reliability was lurking
in the background."0 The move away from almost complete deference
to the sworn testimony of the expert began with State v. Crowder, a
case dealing with the admissibility of evidence of gunshot residue on
the hands of the defendant as disclosed by flameless atomic absorp-
tion spectrophotometry.8 ' Albert Crowder was convicted of first-
degree murder in the shooting death of his girlfriend, Peggy Ann Bry-
ant."2 At trial, the prosecutor offered the expert opinion of R.D. Cone,
a chemist with the State Bureau of Investigation, that the results of the
flameless atomic absorption spectrophotometry test when applied to
wipings taken from the defendant's hands revealed the presence of bar-
ium, antimony, and lead, thus indicating the defendant had recently
fired a gun. 3 Crowder's counsel objected, claiming the tests were
"speculative and highly unreliable.""4 The trial court overruled the
objection.8 5
80. State v. Foye, 120 S.E.2d 169, 171 (N.C. 1961) (excluding polygraph evidence
because the "lie detector has not yet attained scientific acceptance as a reliable and
accurate means of ascertaining truth or deception" (citations omitted)).
81. 203 S.E.2d 38 (N.C. 1974). In the flameless atomic absorption analysis
method, a suspect's hands are wiped with cotton swabs saturated with a nitric acid
solution. The solution is extracted from the swab and placed on a metal strip in an
instrument called the flameless atomic absorption spectrophotometer. The metal strip
is heated, causing the elements present in the liquid to vaporize and form an atomic
cloud. A light beam is passed through the cloud at specific wavelengths designed to
detect the presence of barium and antimony. If these two elements are found in
sufficient quantity, it signals the presence of gunshot residue. Neither barium nor
antimony are elements commonly found in the environment. Based on independent
laboratory tests, levels higher than .2 micrograms of antimony and .3 micrograms of
barium indicate the presence of gunshot residue. See State v. Chatman, 383 A.2d 440,
441 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978) (describing test).
82. State v. Crowder, 203 S.E.2d 38, 39-40 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003).
83. Id. at 38.
84. Id. at 45.
85. Id. at 45-46.
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The supreme court began its analysis of the expert testimony
assignment of error with the proposition, without any citation to
authority, that "[s]cientific tests of this nature are competent only
when shown to be reliable." 6 In its reliability analysis, the court first
noted Mr. Cone's professional experience and training, particularly
relying on Mr. Cone's own testimony concerning the reliability of
flameless atomic absorption spectrophotometry. 7 The court specifi-
cally noted that Mr. Cone was experienced in gunshot residue tests,
had presented papers on the subject, and had conducted laboratory
experiments to evaluate the accuracy of the method."" The court then
looked beyond Cone's background, experience, and testimony as to
the reliability of the method and examined scientific literature on the
subject, noting the published literature supported Cone's opinion as to
reliability. 9 There is no indication, however, that Cone relied upon
any of the published literature to support his opinion or that the trial
judge considered the literature when ruling on the admissibility of the
expert testimony.90 Nonetheless, the court found Cone's method suffi-
ciently reliable and thus admissible despite the fact it did not exclude
"every remote possibility of error. ' 91
Crowder is significant in the evolution of North Carolina's law of
expert testimony because it specifically conditioned the admissibility
of the opinion testimony on the scientific reliability of the underlying
test. In affirming the trial court's admission of the evidence, however,
the court continued its century-long habit of relying heavily, if not
exclusively, upon the qualifications of the witness and his own testi-
mony concerning the reliability of his method. 92 The court's discus-
sion of scientific literature supporting the reliability of barium,
antimony, and lead as indicators of recently firing a weapon was
merely in the context of distinguishing it from the discredited dermal
nitrate, or paraffin test, previously used by some jurisdictions as evi-
dence of recent weapon discharge.93
While Crowder adopted reliability as the test for admission of
expert opinion based on scientific tests, it reaffirmed the long-stand-
ing practice of deferring to the sworn testimony of the witness to estab-
86. Id. at 46.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Record on Appeal at 65-76, State v. Crowder, 203 S.E.2d 38 (N.C. 1974) (No.
7).
91. Crowder, 203 S.E.2d at 47.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 46.
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lish that reliability. Just as Dr. Rivers's testimony in Horton v. Green
that his training and experience as a physician enabled him to diag-
nose diseases and their duration in mules, though he had never done
so previously, was sufficient to find him competent and his opinion
admissible,94 so too was Cone's sworn testimony that the presence of
barium, antimony, and lead on the defendant's hand indicated he had
recently fired a weapon.95 While Horton involved a professional judg-
ment based on professional training and experience and Crowder dealt
with the results of a scientific test that the expert had personally
researched and conducted, the facts upon which the trial courts in
each case based their admissibility decisions all came from the sworn
testimony of the expert.
Over the next decade, the court routinely relied upon Crowder for
the proposition that scientific testimony must be reliable to be admissi-
ble, but also continued the practice of deferring almost exclusively to
the sworn testimony of the proffered expert to establish that
reliability.
96
D. Reliability Refined97
The seminal case in the development of the North Carol-
ina approach to the reliability of expert opinion is State v. Bul-
94. Horton v. Green, 64 N.C. 64, 66-67 (1870).
95. Crowder, 203 S.E.2d at 46.
96. See, e.g., State v. Sparks, 255 S.E.2d 373, 381-83 (N.C. 1979) (citing Crowder
for the proposition that scientific tests must be reliable and finding testimony by
State's forensic chemist sufficient to establish reliability of test to determine presence
of nitrites on defendant's clothes); State v. Mayhand, 259 S.E.2d 231, 237 (N.C. 1979)
(citing Crowder for the proposition that scientific tests must be reliable and excluding
an FBI laboratory report showing none of the victim's hairs were found on the
defendant's clothes as hearsay because no one with personal knowledge of the testing
testified to lay the foundation for the report); State v. Gray, 233 S.E.2d 905, 914-15
(N.C. 1977) (citing Crowder for the proposition that scientific tests must be reliable
and finding testimony of the State's expert forensic chemist sufficient to establish the
reliability of the results of absorption inhibition tests to establish defendant's blood
type as the same blood type found on vaginal swabs from rape victim and on cigarette
dropped by rapist at crime scene); see also State v. Green, 290 S.E.2d 625, 629-30
(N.C. 1982) (holding testimony of State's expert forensic odontologist sufficient to
establish reliability of methodology to link defendant to the victim through bite mark
identification); State v. Temple, 273 S.E.2d 273, 279-81 (N.C. 1981) (holding
testimony of State's expert forensic odontologist and expert forensic pathologist
sufficient to establish reliability of methodology to link defendant to the victim
through bite mark identification).
97. In 1981 the Legislative Research Commission's Study Committee on the Laws
of Evidence and Comparative Negligence recommended continued study with a view
towards codifying the rules of evidence. Legislative Research Commission Report to
16
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lard.98 In 1978, Pedro Hales shot and wounded Vonnie Ray Bullard's
son, but was acquitted by a jury on a claim of self-defense. 99 The ver-
dict did not sit well with Bullard and on several occasions over the next
couple of years Bullard threatened to kill Hales.' °° When Hales sud-
denly and mysteriously disappeared during the late evening hours of
August 25, 1981, suspicion naturally focused on Bullard. 10 1 Wit-
nesses saw Bullard and Hales together earlier in the day on August 25,
and they appeared to be arguing.11 2 Others saw Bullard's truck later
that night leaving a highway bridge over the South River, about four
miles from where Hales was last seen alive. 10 3 The next morning, law
enforcement officers found a large amount of blood, a .22 bullet, bro-
ken glass, bloody bare footprints, a bare footprint in the sand, tire
the 1981 General Assembly of North Carolina: Laws of Evidence and Comparative
Negligence (Jan. 14, 1981). Later that same year the General Assembly passed An Act
to Eliminate the Hypothetical Question that adopted the then-existing version of FED.
R. EvID. 702 and a modified version of FED. R. EvID. 705. H.B. 394, Ch. 543 Session
Laws 1981, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-58.13 (1981) (repealed 1984). Though the language
in the new statute was exactly the same as the language the Supreme Court of the
United States later relied upon in Daubert to reject the Frye standard and require the
trial judge to exclude expert testimony that was not reliable or relevant, the enactment
of the statute was not intended to, nor did it have the effect of, altering the North
Carolina practice in any way other than eliminating the requirement for the
hypothetical question. 1 BRANDIS ON NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 136 at 538-39 (2d
rev. ed. 1982) ("Effective October 1, 1981, a statute provides that hypothetical
questions may no longer be required, though it does not prohibit their voluntary
use .... [I]t seems to require, in general, no change in the principles governing: (1)
upon what an opinion may be based; and (2) the extent to which the expert may testify
to the basis for his opinion."). Thus, despite the reform in expert testimony wrought
through the adoption of FED. R. EID. 702, the North Carolina practice of admitting the
testimony of a qualified expert whose opinion could help the jury understand the
evidence or determine a question in the case remained unchanged. Crowder remained
the appropriate standard. In 1984 the General Assembly completed the codification of
the law of evidence in North Carolina by enacting the North Carolina Rules of
Evidence, a comprehensive evidence code patterned after the federal rules. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 8C-1, Rules 101-1102 (2003). N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-58.13 was repealed
because the new rules 702 and 705 were identical to the earlier statute. For
contemporary analysis of the evidence reform efforts in North Carolina, see Walter J.
Blakley, Examination of Expert Witnesses in North Carolina, 61 N.C. L. REv. 1 (1982)
and Walter J. Blakely, Moving Towards an Evidence Law of General Principles: Several
Suggestions Concerning an Evidence Code for North Carolina, 13 N.C. CENT. L. J. 1
(1981).
98. 322 S.E.2d 370 (1984).
99. Id. at 372.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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tracks, and a piece of a safety belt assembly on that same bridge. 10 4 A
search of Bullard's truck later that day revealed a blood smear match-
ing Hales's blood type, a damaged seat belt assembly matching the one
found at the bridge, and a broken window with glass matching the
glass found at the bridge.10 5 Hales's body was found in the river sev-
eral days later. 10 6 He had been stabbed seventeen times and shot three
times. 10 7 A .22 bullet was removed from his body during the
autopsy.' 0 "
Detectives investigating the case took photographs of the bloody
bare footprint on the bridge and of the bare footprint in the sand. 10 9
The detectives also sprayed the bloody print on the bridge pavement
with luminol, which enhanced the bloody portions of the print, and
photographed the luminol-enhanced print."0 Investigators took ink
and latex paint impressions of Bullard's bare feet and compared them
to the photos of the footprints found at the bridge.' The latent evi-
dence section at the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI) could not see
any ridge pattern details in the photographs and was unable to iden-
tify the prints using techniques and methods commonly used in
matching latent fingerprints or footprints with known prints." 2
Having failed to identify the footprints on the bridge using stan-
dard techniques, the SBI sent the photos and print exemplars from Bul-
lard to Dr. Louise Robbins, a physical anthropologist and faculty
member at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro." 3 Dr.
Robbins claimed to be able to identify footprints based on size and
shape without relying on ridge pattern details.' She examined the
photographs of the footprints taken at the bridge, compared them to
the exemplars from Bullard, and concluded that Bullard left the prints
on the bridge." 5
Bullard objected to Robbins's testimony at trial." 6 The trial court
overruled the objection, admitted the testimony, and the jury convicted
104. Id. at 373.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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Bullard of Hales's murder.' 17 Before the supreme court, l18 Bullard
claimed the following errors in admitting the expert testimony:
1. The trial court erred in allowing Dr. Robbins to testify as an expert
in the field of footprint identification when, in fact, as shown by the
evidence adduced in voir dire hearing prior to her testimony, there is
no such area of such expertise recognized by our law;
2. The trial court erred in failing to exclude or suppress Dr. Robbins's
testimony because it has no basis or recognition whatever in the scien-
tific community and is not sufficiently reliable or acceptable by the
court;
3. The trial court erred by failing to grant defendant's motion to strike
the opinion testimony of Dr. Robbins because she was not properly
qualified to give such an opinion, and her testimony was too specula-
tive and had no basis in science or fact;
4. The trial court erred in allowing Dr. Robbins to testify as an expert
and give her opinion because the court did not make findings of fact as
to her expertise.
1 19
The court saw the allegations of error as falling into two broad
categories. The first three all revolved around whether the methods or
techniques employed by Dr. Robbins were scientifically valid and
whether she applied those techniques reliably in reaching her opin-
ion. 120 The fourth allegation of error was, essentially, a challenge to
whether Dr. Robbins was properly qualified and whether the subject
matter of her testimony was an appropriate subject for opinion
testimony. 121
The court began by addressing the subject matter appropriateness
and qualification issue.' 2 2 First, the court said, "[i]t is undisputed that
expert testimony is properly admissible when such testimony can
assist the jury to draw certain inferences from facts because the expert
is better qualified.' 1 23 The court then quoted chapter 8, section 58.13
of the North Carolina statutes to support the principle of admitting
expert testimony because the expert knows more about the subject
than the jury.'2 4 Second, the court recognized that to testify in North
117. Id. at 372.
118. Bullard's appeal of his conviction and life sentence went directly to the
Supreme Court under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-27(a) (1981).
119. Bullard, 322 S.E.2d at 374.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 375.
122. Id. at 376.
123. Id. (citing Cogdill v. Highway Comm'n, 182 S.E.2d 373 (N.C. 1971)).
124. Id. This is the only reference to the statutory provision applicable to the
admission of expert testimony in the opinion. See also supra note 97.
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Carolina "[i]t is not necessary that an expert be experienced with the
identical subject area in a particular case or that the expert be a spe-
cialist, licensed, or even engaged in a specific profession.' 1 25 Finally,
the court noted that the trial judge has broad discretion in determining
the admissibility of expert testimony. 126
In applying the concept that expert testimony is admissible if the
expert knows more about the subject matter than the jury and the jury
would be aided in receiving the expert's opinion, the court reviewed
Dr. Robbins's education, training, and experience. 127 The court found
that making the footprint comparisons involved an area of knowledge
"beyond the realm" of the average juror.'2 8 Dr. Robbins's superior
knowledge allowed her to find "unusual and distinct" features in the
footprints she examined. 129 She made acetate overlays of the prints
and made visual comparisons with the naked eye and with a magnify-
ing glass. 130 While the court recognized Dr. Robbins had no formal
training in footprint identification, she had conducted extensive inde-
pendent study and research into the subject over a fourteen-year
period and was formally trained and experienced in the recognized
field of physical anthropology.' 3 ' Thus, the court found Dr. Robbins
was "clearly in a superior position and better qualified [than the aver-
age juror] to compare the bloody bare footprint found on the bridge
with those of the defendant" and held that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in finding Dr. Robbins a qualified witness and her testi-
mony helpful to the jury. 13 2
Turning to the other assignments of error, the court framed the
issue as "[w]hether scientific evidence which tends to identify an
accused by bare footprint comparison is admissible where the expert
relies upon methods other than ridge detail in making such compari-
sons. ' 133 Bullard argued that Dr. Robbins's technique of visually com-
paring the size and shape of the foot in four areas (the toe, the ball, the
125. Id. (citing State v. Phifer, 225 S.E.2d 786 (N.C. 1976), cert. denied, 492 U.S.
1123 (1977); Shaw v. Sylvester, 116 S.E.2d 351 (N.C. 1960)).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 375-76.
128. Id. at 376.
129. Id. at 376-77.
130. Id. at 377.
131. Id. at 375.
132. Id. at 376.
133. Id. at 379. The North Carolina Supreme Court had already admitted expert
testimony based on ridge pattern comparison. State v. Rogers, 64 S.E.2d 572 (N.C.
1951), rev'd on other grounds, State v. Silver, 213 S.E.2d 247 (N.C. 1975). See supra
notes 68-78 and accompanying text for a discussion of Rogers.
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arch, and the heel) and drawing conclusions as to the identity of the
print required the jury to make a "leap of faith" and accept "at face
value the ultimate opinion of a person who professes to be the only
one skilled in a particular subject area."'134 Because Dr. Robbins's
technique was novel, untested, and unreported in any other judicial
decision, Bullard claimed, the court must make an independent deter-
mination as to whether the technique is "reliable and sufficiently
established to have gained general acceptance in the field. ' 135 In other
words, Bullard asked the court to apply Frye's general acceptance test
and reject the evidence because the relevant scientific community had
not embraced it as reliable.' 36 The court declined to adopt Frye and
noted the lack of recognition by others "does not per se prevent the
admissibility ... [of the evidence].' 37 Instead, the court was willing to
give novel techniques time to develop and show their reliability rather
than rejecting them outright.
Turning from the question of whether a lack of general acceptance
by the relevant scientific community requires rejection of the evidence,
the court next considered whether this evidence, though novel and not
generally accepted, was nevertheless reliable.' 38 Three overarching
principles directed its inquiry: (1) scientific methods of crime detec-
tion are favored; (2) scientific reliability is determined by judicial
notice, the testimony of experts in the area, or both; and (3) the focus
is on the reliability of the scientific method, not its popularity within a
scientific community. 139 The court then reviewed over twenty years of
legal precedent from North Carolina and other jurisdictions and iden-
tified five "significant factors relied upon by the courts when evaluat-
ing whether a scientific method in its infancy is reliable and whether it
should be adopted or rejected."' 4 °
The first "significant factor" is whether the data underlying the
expert's opinion is verifiable by the court. 14 ' Because Dr. Robbins
used visual exhibits to fully explain what she considered significant in
the footprint comparisons, the court and the jury were able to verify
134. Bullard, 322 S.E.2d at 379. Dr. Robbins testified during voir dire that she was
the only person in the United States who used this particular technique of footprint
identification. She claimed that an investigator with Scotland Yard and a German
detective, as well as several people in India, use the same methods. Id. at 374 n.2.
135. Id. at 379.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 379-80.
139. Id. at 380-81.
140. Id. at 381.
141. Id. (citing State v. Temple, 273 S.E.2d 273, 280 (N.C. 1981)).
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the underlying data, including her measurements and the interrela-
tionships of the various portions of the footprints, without having to
"sacrifice its independence by accepting her scientific hypotheses on
faith.' '1
4 2
The second "significant factor" identified by the court is whether
the expert applied established techniques to solve a particular, albeit
novel, problem. 143 Dr. Robbins's methods involved "scientifically
established measurement techniques relied upon in the established
field of physical anthropology.' 1 44 Thus, the court concluded, she
applied well-accepted and established methods to address a novel
problem.
The professed experience of the expert in the relevant field was
the third "significant factor" identified by the court. 145 Dr. Robbins's
professional background as a physical anthropologist was unchal-
lenged. She earned a Ph.D. in the field and at the time of trial had
been a full-time faculty member in the physical anthropology depart-
ment at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro for ten
years. 146 She served in similar positions in two other universities
before coming to Greensboro.' 47
The fourth and fifth "significant factors," the expert's presentation
of technical papers and publications and the expert's independent
research, like the third factor, are intimately associated with the
expert's qualifications. 148 Dr. Robbins taught courses in forensic
anthropology, published an article dealing with the individuality of
footprints, and presented papers at various technical meetings and
seminars. 149 At the time of trial, she was anticipating publishing a
book on the subject. 150 Also, Dr. Robbins claimed to have done exten-
sive independent research into the uniqueness of human footprints. 151
She told the court she began studying and collecting human footprints
in 1971 and had amassed a collection of over 1,200 footprints and
examined thousands more.
1 52
142. Id. at 382.
143. Id. at 381.
144. Id. at 382.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 375 n.3.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 382.
149. Id. at 375 n.3.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 375 n.4.
152. Id.
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The application of these five factors to the proffered testimony led
the court to conclude, "Dr. Robbins's unique scientific method is relia-
ble because of her explanatory testimony, professional background,
independent research, and use of established procedures to make her
visual comparisons of bare footprints."' 3 Also significant to the
court's conclusion was the difference between Dr. Robbins's area of
scientific inquiry and cases rejecting admission of polygraph and hyp-
nosis evidence.' 54 Polygraph and hypnosis evidence seek to "explore
the workings of the mind" while Dr. Robbins's testimony dealt with a
scientific method readily understandable and demonstrable to the jury
through the use of visual aids and in-court comparisons of the known
and unknown footprints.
15 5
After determining Dr. Robbins's testimony was reliable, the court
addressed whether the testimony was relevant. Defining relevant evi-
dence as having "any logical tendency however slight to prove the fact
at issue in the case,"' 56 the court concluded evidence of Bullard's pres-
ence at the crime scene through his bare footprints had a logical ten-
dency to connect him to the crime.'
57
Bullard thus established the rule in North Carolina that expert tes-
timony must be both relevant and reliable and that general acceptance
by the scientific community was not the sine qua non of admissibility.
In this regard, it foreshadowed Daubert by almost ten years. Though
not couched in the exact terms and analytical framework of Daubert,
the stated goal of both cases is to admit reliable and relevant expert
opinion and exclude those opinions that are irrelevant, unreliable, or
both.
E. The Reliability Standard Revisited
Six years after Bullard, the court revisited the issue of reliability of
expert testimony in State v. Pennington.158 In Pennington, the State
offered DNA profiling evidence to identify the defendant as the rap-
ist.'5 9 The court noted at the outset that "[a] new scientific method of
proof is admissible at trial if the method is sufficiently reliable,"' 6 ° but
eschewed the Frye standard as the exclusive index of reliability. The
153. Id. at 383.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 384.
156. Id. (quoting State v. Pratt, 295 S.E.2d 462, 466 (N.C. 1982)).
157. Id.
158. 393 S.E.2d 847 (N.C. 1990).
159. Id. at 845.
160. Id. at 852 (quoting State v. Bullard, 322 S.E.2d 370, 381 (N.C. 1984)).
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court then applied the Bullard factors and found expert testimony iden-
tifying the defendant as the source of semen found at the scene, based
on restriction fragment length polymorphism analysis, reliable and
admissible. 161
The trial court conducted a lengthy hearing on the admissibility
of the DNA evidence. 162 Three experts for the State, a forensic serolo-
gist, a professor of genetics and microbiology with twenty-two years of
experience in extracting DNA, and the scientist who performed the
DNA analysis all testified that the DNA profiling method used was reli-
able and generally accepted within the scientific community. 163
While the trial court seemed to place great weight on the State's
evidence establishing the DNA profiling method as generally accepted
within the scientific community, the supreme court did not find the
admission of the evidence at trial appropriate simply because the
methods were generally accepted within the scientific community. 164
Pointing to "reliability of the scientific method" as the appropriate
inquiry, the court applied the Bullard factors: (1) the expert's use of
established techniques, (2) the expert's qualifications and professional
background, (3) the use of visual aids or other illustrations so the jury
is not asked to merely accept the expert's opinion on faith, and (4) the
expert's relevant independent research in the area. 165
Applying the Bullard factors to the proffered DNA testimony in
this case, the court noted that Dr. George Herrin, the State's expert,
used established techniques that were considered reliable within the
scientific community.1 66 In reviewing the extensive and impressive
professional background of Dr. Herrin, the court mentioned he not
only had a Ph.D. in biochemistry with a specialization in molecular
biology, he had also done post-doctoral research in molecular biology,
published over a dozen articles and abstracts on molecular biology,
161. Id. at 853-54.
162. Id. at 853.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. The opinion does not cite or refer to N.C. R. EVID. 702, which had been in
effect for some nine years. Presumably, the failure to cite to Rule 702 was because the
qualifications of the witness were not an issue. Bullard recognized five "significant
factors" to guide the court in determining reliability. See supra notes 98-157 and
accompanying text. Pennington reduced the number to four by eliminating any
specific reference to publications and technical papers. Arguably, the expert's
publications and technical papers on topics relevant to the area of his testimony are
subsumed in the independent research or professional background and experience
factors.
166. Pennington, 393 S.E.2d at 853.
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and had conducted DNA profile testing on over one hundred DNA
samples.167
The testimony also passed the third Bullard factor because Dr.
Herrin used visual aids to help the jury understand the nature of DNA
and the DNA profiling process. 168  He showed the jury the radio-
graphic film of the DNA results so they could see the actual compari-
son between the sample found at the crime scene and the known
sample taken from the defendant. 169 The court was satisfied "the jury
was not asked 'to sacrifice its independence by accepting [the] scien-
tific hypothesis on faith.' '11
70
Finally, the witness's independent research in his post-doctoral
studies and the conduct of other DNA profiling tests over the years
prior to his involvement in the instant case satisfied the fourth Bullard
prong and convinced the court the "expert testimony in this case
"1171established the reliability of the DNA profiling process ....
The issue of the reliability of expert opinion presented itself again
in State v. Goode.1 72 In determining whether to admit evidence from
the State's blood spatter expert that the absence of blood on the defen-
dant's clothes did not exculpate him from participation in the stabbing
murder of the victim, the court cited the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Daubert and quoted Rule 702, but applied the Bul-
lard-Pennington analysis.1 73 Noting the blood spatter expert testified
that bloodstain pattern interpretation is a "specialized crime scene
technique" and trained bloodstain pattern interpreters not only study
the characteristics of blood spatters but also recreate situations to
determine how certain categories of stains are produced, the court
found bloodstain pattern interpretation an appropriate area for expert
testimony.' 74 Additionally, the court noted other jurisdictions had
reached the same conclusion.175
Having found bloodstain pattern interpretation a reliable and
appropriate area for expert opinion based on the testimony of a quali-
fied expert and the judicial recognition by other jurisdictions, the
court then addressed whether the absence of bloodstains on the defen-
167. Id. at 853-54.
168. Id. at 854.
169. Id.
170. Id. (quoting State v. Bullard, 322 S.E.2d 370, 382 (N.C. 1984)).
171. Id.
172. 461 S.E.2d 631 (N.C. 1995).
173. Id. at 639-40.
174. Id. at 641.
175. Id. at 641-42.
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dant's clothes did not exculpate him from participation. 176 The court
reviewed the testimony of the expert and concluded:
Thus, due to Agent Deaver's study of autopsy photographs in this case
as well as in other cases, examination of the clothing of the victims and
co-defendants in this case as well as in other cases, and participation
in the examination of crime scenes where bloodstains did occur and
other cases where bloodstains did not occur, we conclude his testi-
mony was properly admitted to aid the jury in making its
determination. 1
7 7
The court's failure to specifically set out how the Bullard factors
applied to the facts of this case is unfortunate. Upon close examina-
tion, however, we can identify at least three of the Bullard factors that
influenced the court's conclusion. First, the court was impressed with
the training, experience, and qualifications of Agent Deaver as a blood-
stain pattern interpretation expert.178 Bullard recognizes the expert's
experience as a significant factor in determining reliability. 179 Second,
the court's reference to Agent Deaver's involvement in crime scenes
and bloodstain patterns in other cases resembles Bullard's emphasis
on the expert's research and work in cases other than the one at bar.18 0
Finally, the Bullard court considered whether the expert used estab-
lished techniques in reaching his opinion.' 8 ' The techniques Agent
Deaver applied to form his opinion in Goode were the same techniques
the court found sufficient to accept bloodstain pattern interpretation
as a legitimate and reliable area of technical knowledge.18 2
There is no discussion in Goode of whether the data upon which
the opinion was based was verifiable through the use of visual aids or
whether the expert had published any papers on the subject, two fac-
tors considered significant in Bullard. Arguably, whether the expert
has published any papers on the subject is part of the expert's profes-
sional background and experience, a factor already considered.' 3
Similarly, not all expert opinion testimony will lend itself to visual
presentation like the footprint comparisons in Bullard.184 That is
176. Id. at 642-43.
177. Id. at 643-44.
178. Id. at 642.
179. State v. Bullard, 322 S.E.2d 370, 382 (N.C. 1984).
180. Goode, 461 S.E.2d at 642.
181. Bullard, 322 S.E.2d at 379.
182. Goode, 461 S.E.2d at 641.
183. See State v. Pennington, 393 S.E.2d 847, 853 (N.C. 1990).
184. Presumably, the autopsy photographs relied upon by Agent Deaver were
admitted and shown to the jury and served, to some extent, as visual aids that could
have helped explain his opinion. The court, however, does not mention that. As a
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especially true here, where the essence of the expert's opinion con-
cerns the absence of blood spatter. In any case, the Goode court
thought the reliability determination was a flexible inquiry and found
the testimony admissible.
Three years after Goode, the North Carolina Supreme Court
addressed the reliability of expert testimony again in State v. Helms. '8 5
In a prosecution for driving while impaired, the trial court admitted
testimony from a state trooper who conducted a horizontal gaze nys-
tagmus (HGN) test that, in the opinion of the trooper, indicated the
defendant was intoxicated. 18 6 Citing Daubert, as well as Bullard, Pen-
nington, and Goode, the North Carolina Court of Appeals held the trial
judge erred in admitting the results of the HGN test without first deter-
mining its scientific reliability, but found the error harmless and
affirmed the conviction. 18 7
The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals'
holding that admission of the HGN test results was harmless and
remanded the case for a new trial.18 8 Interestingly, the court did not
leave the court of appeals' admissibility standard for expert testimony
unaddressed.' 89 While agreeing that admitting the HGN test results
without a showing of reliability was error, the supreme court based its
analysis solely on Bullard, Pennington, and Goode.190 The court did
not refer to Daubert.191
matter of good trial practice lawyers should look for ways to engage all of the jurors'
senses, not just their sense of hearing. While some testimony may not lend itself to
illustrative or visual presentations, most will, and lawyers should take maximum
advantage of visual exhibits to enhance the persuasive power of their case. See L.
TIMOTHY PERRIN, H. MITCHELL CALDWELL & CAROL A. CHASE, THE ART & SCIENCE OF
TRIAL ADVOCACY 247 (2003) ("Exhibits bring an extra dimension to all parts of trial.
They are tangible; they can be seen, touched, smelled. And, of course, that which can
be seen or even felt resonates more powerfully and more memorably than that which
can only be heard.").
185. 504 S.E.2d 293 (N.C. 1998).
186. Id. at 293-94 ("In administering the HGN test, the subject is asked to cover one
eye and then use the remaining eye to track the lateral progress of an object (usually a
pen) as the officer moves the object at eye-level across the subject's field of vision. As
the moving object travels toward the outside of the subject's vision, the officer watches
the subject's eye for "nystagmus" - an involuntary jerking movement of the eyeball. If
the person's eyeball exhibits nystagmus, and especially if the nystagmus occurs before
the moving object has traveled forty-five degrees from the center of the person's vision,
this is taken as an indication that the person is intoxicated.").
187. State v. Helms, 490 S.E.2d 565, 569 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997).
188. Helms, 504 S.E.2d at 296.
189. Id. at 295.
190. Id.
191. Id.
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F. The Reliability Standard Reaffirmed
The Bullard, Pennington, Goode, and Helms line of cases, like
Daubert and its progeny, impose gatekeeping responsibilities on the
trial judge, vest wide discretion in the trial judge to determine admissi-
bility of expert testimony, and condition admissibility upon a finding
of reliability and relevance. But the North Carolina Supreme Court has
applied its Bullard factors to determine reliability rather than adopting
the Daubert factors. While the North Carolina Supreme Court's juris-
prudence is consistent with Daubert in rejecting Frye and focusing on
reliability, the reliability inquiry applied by the North Carolina
Supreme Court is different, and less stringent, than the Daubert stan-
dard. The North Carolina Court of Appeals, however, failed to appreci-
ate the difference and cited Goode for the proposition that Daubert
governed the admissibility of expert testimony in state court.192
The case of Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd. provided the opportu-
nity for the supreme court to set the record straight. 9 3 Dr. Howerton,
a dentist and off-road motorcycle enthusiast, was riding his motorcycle
at a motocross practice track when he collided with another cyclist.' 94
Dr. Howerton was thrown over the handlebars of his bike and landed
upside down on the back of his head.' 95 He was wearing a motorcycle
helmet with a flexible, removable guard across the chin and mouth
that was secured on each side of the helmet by nylon screws.' 96 The
impact with the ground forced Dr. Howerton's head down, broke the
chin guard off the helmet, and drove his chin into his chest.' 97 The
extreme forward rotation of Dr. Howerton's head and neck broke verte-
brae in his neck and left him permanently paralyzed from the neck
down. 19
8
Dr. Howerton sued the helmet manufacturer alleging the helmet
was negligently designed and manufactured and was unreasonably
dangerous under ordinary usage because the chin guard broke off at
impact allowing the wearer's head to rotate too far forward.' 99 Dr.
192. State v. Bates, 538 S.E.2d 597, 600 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) ("An expert may
testify about her opinion so long as her opinion is relevant, helpful to the jury, and
based on an adequate scientific foundation." (citing N.C. R. Evid. 702, 705; State v.
Goode, 461 S.E.2d 631 (N.C. 1995) (adopting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509
U.S. 579 (1993)))).
193. 597 S.E.2d 674 (N.C. 2004).
194. Id. at 677.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 677-78.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 677.
199. Id. at 678.
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Howerton claimed the chin guard should limit the forward rotation of
the head and neck by stopping against the wearer's chest, thus protect-
ing the head and neck from over rotation.2°° To support his claim that
the defendant's helmet was defective and the defect caused his injury,
Dr. Howerton produced four expert witnesses. 20 1
Professor Hugh Hurt, the president of the Head Protection
Research Laboratory of Southern California at the University of Cali-
fornia, was of the opinion the flexible chin guard on the helmet was
defectively designed and manufactured so that it broke on impact and
did not arrest the forward movement of Howerton's head and neck.20 2
William C. Hutton, professor and director of orthopedic research at
Emory University School of Medicine, believed the breaking of the flex-
ible chin guard allowed Howerton's head and neck to travel beyond
their normal range of motion, resulting in a hyperflexion and compres-
sion injury that produced the paralysis.20 3 The third expert, James
Hooper, a design engineer of motorcycle helmets, was of the view that
the design of Howerton's helmet offered no protection on impact and
actually created a hazard of injury due to the flexible nature of the
chin guard.20 4 The final expert, Dr. Charles Rawlings, a board-certi-
fied neurosurgeon, reviewed Howerton's medical records and was pre-
pared to testify that Howerton's paralysis was caused by a flexion-
compression injury to the cervical spine.20  Arai Helmet moved to
exclude all of Howerton's experts because:
None of these experts have performed testing relevant to the causation
issues in this case. None have undertaken independent research to
support their hypotheses or subjected their hypotheses to peer-review
via publication. Each has relied upon inadequate or non-existent data
that renders their opinions subject to an unreasonably high rate of
error. Finally, none of these experts have been able to demonstrate
that their opinions are generally accepted within their own fields.20 6
The trial court conducted a brief hearing on defendant's motion
and considered the argument of counsel, discovery materials, and
pleadings. 20 7 The court did not, however, take live testimony from the
200. Id.
201. Id. at 678-79.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 679.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
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experts. 20  The court then excluded all four of the plaintiffs experts,
holding, among other things:
Professor Hurt's opinion that a full-faced helmet would have prevented
plaintiffs injury is not reliable. Professor Hurt's opinion was not
developed through sound scientific or engineering methods. Professor
Hurt has not performed relevant testing or independent research and
has not subjected his hypothesis that full face helmets prevent neck
injuries to peer-review by publishing that claim. Further, he was una-
ble to demonstrate that his hypothesis is generally accepted in his field
by pointing to any published support for his claim. Finally, to the
extent that his methods represent a technique, it is clear that this tech-
nique is subject to an unacceptably high risk of error.
Mr. Hooper is not a medical doctor, an accident reconstructionist, an
expert in biomechanics, or an engineer. He does not have a college
degree.... Mr. Hooper was willing to testify about his own history of
motorcycle accidents involving full-face helmets for the purpose of sup-
porting the inference that a full-face helmet would have prevented
plaintiff's injury. . . . However, [he was] . . . unaware of the salient
details of plaintiffs accident ... [and] was unable to relate the specific
details of his own accidents .... His opinion that a full-faced helmet
would have prevented plaintiffs injury was speculative and based on
inadequate data. Further, Mr. Hooper did not have a reliable basis to
offer any meaningful comparison between his own history of accidents
and plaintiffs accident.
Dr. Charles Rawlings . . . never performed independent research or
testing on the mechanisms of cervical fractures . . . has never pub-
lished any medical article on the mechanisms of cervical fracture ...
[and] never published on hyperflexion neck injuries.... Dr. Rawlings
never examined plaintiff and only reviewed a selected portion of his
medical records ... and he did not have adequate data to ... [compare
plaintiffs injuries to injuries he has treated in his medical practice]. ...
He could not point to any tests, measurements or literature supporting
his opinion [that plaintiffs head rotated ten to twenty degrees beyond
his normal anatomical range]. Dr. Rawlings's opinion that plaintiffs
injury was caused by hyperflexion is speculative and based on inade-
quate data . . . [and] was not based on sound scientific or medical
methods. He has not performed independent research or testing on
cervical injury mechanisms or on hyperflexion. He has never sub-
jected his related hypotheses to peer-review by publication. Moreover,
the hypotheses underlying Dr. Rawlings's opinion are not generally
208. Id.
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accepted. Finally, to the extent that his methods represent a technique,
it is clear that his potential for error is inappropriately high.
Dr. Hutton's opinion that plaintiff's injuries were caused by hyperflex-
ion is not reliable. Dr. Hutton has not researched or tested the hypoth-
eses that he relies on in support of his opinion. He has not subjected
these hypotheses to peer-review by publication. Nor has he shown that
these hypotheses are generally accepted in the field. To the extent that
his methods represent a technique, it is clear that they incorporate an
unacceptably high error rate.2 °9
Finding the expert causation testimony "unreliable under the standard
set out in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., and/or State v.
Pennington," the trial court excluded all of plaintiff's experts and
granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. 2 10
The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed, and claimed, "a
thorough review of our case law . . . [made it] eminently clear that
North Carolina has adopted the Daubert analysis. '2 1 1 Accordingly, the
court of appeals, applying the abuse of discretion standard of review,
evaluated the plaintiffs proffer of expert testimony under the well rec-
ognized Daubert criteria and held the trial court's exclusion of all four
experts was neither arbitrary nor an abuse of discretion.2 1 2 Despite
the unanimous decision of the court of appeals, the North Carolina
Supreme Court granted discretionary review to consider, among other
issues, "whether this Court has adopted the Daubert standard for
determining the admissibility of expert testimony. "213
After setting out the salient facts and quoting extensively from the
trial judge's order excluding Howerton's four experts, the court sur-
veyed the federal standard regarding admissibility of expert testi-
mony.21 4 Writing for the majority, Justice Wainwright summarized
the United States Supreme Court's expert testimony decisions in
Daubert,215 Joiner,2 16 and Khumo Tire.2 17 Justice Wainwright also
pointed out the significance of the holding in Weisgram v. Marley
Co.,218 that permits an appellate court to enter judgment against the
209. Id. at 679-82.
210. Id. at 683-84 (citations omitted).
211. Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 581 S.E.2d 816, 826 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003).
212. Id. at 827-30.
213. Howerton, 597 S.E.2d at 684.
214. Id. at 684-85.
215. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
216. 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
217. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
218. 528 U.S. 440 (2000).
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verdict-winner when the appeals court finds expert testimony was
erroneously admitted and without that testimony the verdict-winner is
unable to support a prima facie case.21 9 He noted the "mechanistic
and rigorous" standards imposed by Daubert, the burden imposed on
trial judges exercising their "gatekeeping" function, and the criticism
of Daubert from both courts and commentators. 220 He concluded the
federal standard did not offer "the most workable solution to the
intractable challenge of separating reliable expert opinions from their
unreliable counterparts [or] of distinguishing science from
pseudoscience. "221
Justice Wainwright's review of the federal standard set the stage
for his explication of the North Carolina rule and his comparison of
the two standards. He noted that the federal and state standards both
admit evidence only if it is relevant and reliable, and under both the
federal rule and state practice the trial judge has discretion to deter-
mine the reliability and relevance of the proffered testimony.222 Under
both systems, abuse of discretion is the standard of appellate review.223
While North Carolina and the federal standard use similar language to
frame the admissibility test, the underlying meanings of the terms are,
however, considerably different.
The court set out and explained the three principles that deter-
mine admissibility under North Carolina law: (1) the methods relied
upon by the expert must be reliable; (2) the opinion testimony must
come from a qualified professional; and (3) the testimony must be rele-
vant.22 4 The second and third principles are rather straightforward. A
"qualified" expert is one who "because of his expertise is in a better
position to have an opinion on the subject than is the trier of fact."22 5
"Relevance" of expert testimony is governed by the same provision as
all other evidence: North Carolina Rule of Evidence 401.226 The rele-
vancy requirement is met if the testimony has "any tendency to make
the existence of any fact of consequence to the determination of the
action more or less probable" and the witness "can assist the jury to
219. Howerton, 597 S.E.2d at 686.
220. Id. at 690.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 688.
223. Id. at 689.
224. Id. at 686 (quoting State v. Goode, 461 S.E.2d 631, 639-41 (N.C. 1995)).
225. Id. at 688 (quoting State v. Goode, 461 S.E.2d 631, 640 (N.C. 1995)).
226. Id. at 688 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rule 401 (2003) "'Relevant
evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is
of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence.").
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draw certain inferences from facts because the expert is better quali-
fied than the jury to draw such inferences. ' 227 Evidence is subject to
exclusion if the probative value of the testimony is substantially out-
weighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. 228  The North Carolina
Supreme Court did not, however, impose a heightened relevancy or
"fit" requirement, like the one found in the federal standard.229
Like the federal practice, the North Carolina rule limits expert tes-
timony to only those opinions based on reliable methodology. 3 ° In
North Carolina, reliability must be established by the testimony of a
qualified expert, by judicial notice, or a combination of the two.2 3 1
Judicial notice is the most straightforward. If the courts of the state
have already accepted the methodology, then there is no need to revisit
that determination each time an opinion based on that methodology is
offered.232 The converse is also true. If the North Carolina Supreme
Court has rejected a methodology as unreliable, the opinion based on
that methodology is presumptively inadmissible absent some new and
substantial improvements in the technique.2 33
When judicial notice is not available and precedent does not exist
to support the reliability of the methodology at issue, the trial judge
must look to the testimony of qualified experts in the field.234 In
determining reliability, the Howerton court instructed the lower courts
to:
[Flocus on the following nonexclusive "indices of reliability" ... the
expert's use of established techniques, the expert's professional back-
ground in the field, the use of visual aids before the jury so that the
jury is not asked "to sacrifice its independence by accepting [the] sci-
entific hypothesis on faith," and independent research conducted by
the expert. 2
3 5
The court was careful, however, to emphasize that the "founda-
tional inquiry into basic methodological adequacy" does not require
the proffered testimony "to be proven conclusively reliable or indispu-
tably valid" before allowing the jury to hear and consider it.2 36 Noting
that the "application of the 'flexible' Daubert standard has been any-
227. Id.
228. Id. at 688-89.
229. Id. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
230. Howerton, 597 S.E.2d at 686.
231. Id. at 687 (quoting State v. Goode, 461 S.E.2d 631, 641 (N.C. 1995)).
232. Id. at 687.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. (quoting State v. Pennington, 393 S.E.2d 847, 852-53 (N.C. 1990)).
236. Id.
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thing but liberal or relaxed and that trial courts . . . have often been
reluctant to stray from the original Daubert factors in their analysis of
the reliability of expert testimony, ''1 37 the court rejected the "'exacting
standards of reliability' demanded by the federal approach" 238 and
reaffirmed North Carolina's "decidedly less mechanistic and rigorous"
test.
2 3 9
Two overarching policy concerns drove the court's consideration.
First, the court was not convinced that imposing on trial judges the
"onerous and impractical position of passing judgment on the substan-
tive merits of the scientific or technical theories undergirding an
expert's opinion" was practical, desirable, or workable. 24 0 Resolving
complex, difficult, and technical issues at the cutting edge of science
and technology is not an easy task for professionals trained in the vari-
ous scientific or technical fields, much less for judges who have no
special scientific or technical expertise. 24  As a result, trial judges
have mechanistically applied the Daubert factors and turned a decision
intended to liberalize the admission of expert testimony242 into a stan-
dard that "actually created a more stringent test for expert evidence
admissibility ... 243
Second, the court was concerned with the "case-dispositive nature
of Daubert proceedings, whereby parties in civil actions may use pre-
trial motions to exclude expert testimony under Daubert to bootstrap
motions for summary judgment that otherwise would not likely suc-
ceed."'244  Preliminary motions to exclude experts' opinions are
decided under North Carolina Rule of Evidence 104(a), where courts
are not bound by the rules of evidence and are not required to view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party as
required under North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 56.24' Accord-
ingly, a court may resolve conflicting issues of material fact relative to
the reliability of the proffered expert opinion adverse to the non-mov-
ing party in the Daubert hearing, exclude the testimony, and make it
impossible for the party to survive the ensuing motion for summary
237. Id. at 691.
238. Id. at 690 (citing Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 455 (2000)).
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 690-91.
242. Id. at 691 (quoting Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588
(1993)).
243. Id. (quoting 2 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE, § 702.5 at
461-62 (5th ed. 2001)).
244. Id.
245. Id. at 692.
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judgment. 246 The court was concerned that this end run around the
procedural requirements for summary judgment could "unnecessarily
encroach upon the constitutionally-mandated function of the jury to
decide issues of fact and assess the weight of the evidence. ' 24 7 What
the Howerton court failed to appreciate, however, is the procedure used
to determine the reliability of expert testimony contributes as much, or
more, to the encroachment upon the function of the jury as does the
substantive standard. Changing the substantive standard without
changing the procedure does not completely solve the problems that
concerned the court in the first instance.248
IV. DETERMINING RELIABILITY OF EXPERT OPINION AFTER HOWERTON
SHOULD BE A QUESTION OF CONDITIONAL RELEVANCE
UNDER RULE 104(B)
The holding of Howerton repudiating Daubert and affirming the
Bullard-Pennington-Goode standard of admissibility of expert testimony
is clear. The North Carolina standard for assessing the reliability of
scientific or technical methodology is not as rigorous as the standard
applied in federal courts. The Howerton decision left no question on
that point. While telling us what the North Carolina standard was not,
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Justice Parker concurred in the court's holding that Daubert was not the
standard in North Carolina. Because "none of plaintiffs expert witnesses had done
independent research or used established techniques to substantiate their respective
... [opinions]," Justice Parker reasoned the evidence failed the Bullard-Pennington-
Goode standard as well. Howerton, 597 S.E. 2d at 695 (Parker, J., dissenting). Justice
Parker overlooked the fact that reliability under Bullard-Pennington-Goode is based on
"testimony by an expert specifically relating to reliability, . . .judicial notice, or ... a
combination of the two." Id. at 687. The Howerton trial judge determined reliability
based on "arguments from counsel, discovery materials, and pleadings." Id. at 679. In
concluding the plaintiffs experts were unreliable, the Howerton trial judge did not
claim to take judicial notice and did not take testimony from any expert. Id. at 679-85.
Expert depositions or reports were included in the discovery materials, but it is
difficult, though perhaps not impossible, to assess credibility without seeing the
witness testify. Furthermore, the "test enunciated in our prior case law" that Justice
Parker purported to apply, is very deferential to the sworn testimony of the experts
themselves. Id. at 694 (Parker, J., dissenting). Bullard, Pennington, and Goode, not to
mention the early common law cases, all relied heavily on the in-court testimony of the
challenged experts to establish reliability when judicial notice was not appropriate.
See supra notes 98-191 and accompanying text. Thus, if reliability cannot be
determined by judicial notice, the court may be obligated to take live testimony in
order to properly apply the Bullard-Pennington-Goode-Howerton standard. See, e.g.,
State v. McVay, 606 S.E.2d 145 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) (extensive voir dire of expert
conducted to determine reliability of opinion).
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the court failed to explain how its standard of admissibility fit within
the larger structure of the rules of evidence and why it rejected the
Daubert substantive test but retained the Daubert procedure. One
commentator has suggested the Howerton court established a "pre-
sumption in favor of ... admissibility" and placed the burden of estab-
lishing unreliability of expert opinion evidence on the opponent.249
Another post-Howerton analysis concluded that "Howerton will be read
as a mandate to admit almost anything, in both civil and criminal
cases."
250
In addition to the substantive standard under Howerton, the rules
of evidence provide a procedural process to address the court's con-
cern that the Daubert standard placed too great a burden on trial
judges and "unnecessarily encroach[ed] upon the constitutionally-
mandated function of the jury to decide issues of fact and to assess the
weight of the evidence."' 251 Applying the doctrine of conditional rele-
vancy to the Howerton substantive test for admissibility will better
achieve the court's goals of reducing the burden on trial judges and
protecting litigants' rights to a jury trial. It will also establish a clear
procedural process to guide judges and lawyers facing the myriad
expert testimony issues the future will bring.252
A. Determining Reliability Under Rule 104(b) is Consistent With the
Rules of Evidence
Daubert placed the responsibility for admitting reliable expert tes-
timony squarely on the trial judge under Rule 104(a).253 The question
of reliability, under Daubert, is a preliminary matter for the trial judge
249. Kenneth S. Broun, Scientific Evidence in North Carolina After Howerton-A
Presumption of Admissibility? N.C. STATE B. J., Spring 2005, at 8, 11.
250. John M. Conley & Scott W. Gaylord, We Are Not a Daubert State - But What Are
We? Scientific Evidence in North Carolina after Howerton, 6 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 289, 304
(2005).
251. Howerton, 597 S.E.2d at 692.
252. Judicial notice may be used to establish the reliability of a particular method or
process. Howerton, 597 S.E.2d at 687. Whether established by judicial notice or the
testimony of an expert, the reliable application of an otherwise reliable methodology is
always sui generis. Ultimately, it is the reliability of the expert testimony that is
important, not just the methodology. The procedural paradigm suggested here allows
for consideration of both the methodology and its application in a given case. Should
precedent or judicial notice establish a given methodology as reliable as a matter of
law, the only reliability question for the jury under Rule 104(b) would be the
reliability of the expert's application of the methodology and the court should so
instruct the jury. See infra note 348 for a suggested jury instruction.
253. Daubert v. Merrel Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993).
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and in deciding reliability the judge is not bound by the rules of
evidence. 254
The court in Howerton was particularly concerned with the proce-
dural advantage awarded to the opponent of expert testimony when
scientific validity was determined by the trial judge under Rule
104(a).2 55  The "sweeping pre-trial 'gatekeeping' authority under
Daubert," the court said, "may unnecessarily encroach upon the con-
stitutionally-mandated function of the jury to decide issues of fact and
assess the weight of the evidence. ' 256 Avoiding this concern, in large
measure, drove the court to reject Daubert and reaffirm the Bullard-
Pennington-Goode standard. The court acknowledged at the outset of
the Howerton opinion that "it is well-established that the trial court
must decide preliminary questions concerning the qualifications of
experts to testify or the admissibility of expert testimony," but it did
not specifically address the last clause of the first sentence of Rule
104(a) which subjects the judge's function under Rule 104(a) to the
conditional relevancy standard of Rule 104(b).257 When the relevancy
of an item of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of
fact, the trial judge merely screens the evidence offered to support the
existence of the condition of fact; the jury ultimately decides whether
the condition exists.258
The most common examples of conditional relevancy in operation
are found in the requirement for authentication. Rule 901(a) of both
the Federal Rules of Evidence and the North Carolina Rules of Evi-
dence requires the proponent to produce "evidence sufficient to sup-
port a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent
claims. "259 The judge does not decide if the article is really what the
proponent claims. Rather, the judge screens the foundation evidence
to determine whether it is sufficient to support a finding by the jury
254. FED. R. EVID. 104(a) ("Preliminary questions concerning the qualifications of a
person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence
shall be determined by the court, subject to the provisions of subdivision (b). In
making its determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with
respect to privileges."); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rule 104(a) (2003).
255. Howerton, 597 S.E.2d at 692.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 686. See FED. R. EVID. 104(b) ("When the relevancy of evidence depends
upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon or subject to,
the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the
condition."); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rule 104(b) (2003) (same language as
the federal rule).
258. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rule 104(b) (2003).
259. FED. R. EvID. 901(a); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rule 901(a) (2003).
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that the article is what the proponent claims. If the foundation evi-
dence is sufficient to support a jury finding that the article is authen-
tic, the standard is met and the ultimate decision as to the authenticity
of the item is for the jury.260
Importantly, in screening the foundation evidence for sufficiency,
the judge does not have to resolve credibility battles between witnesses
offering conflicting testimony on the authenticity issue. He does not
have to make findings of fact nor decide the authenticity issue himself.
The judge merely decides whether the proponent's evidence in support
of the authenticity requirement is believable enough for a jury to find
the article genuine. This critical distinction between the role of the
judge and jury when conditional relevancy arises gives procedural
structure to the Howerton standard. The distinction also explains how
the North Carolina Supreme Court can use the same words-relevance
and reliability-to describe the admissibility standards for expert testi-
mony in state court as the United States Supreme Court used in
Daubert, but apply a much less mechanistic and rigorous test.
There is no question the court in Daubert decided the reliability
issue was assigned to the trial judge under Rule 104(a) and not a mat-
ter of conditional relevancy under 104(b). But this assignment of
"gatekeeping" responsibility to the trial judge under Rule 104(a) is not
demanded by the text of the rules of evidence. In fact, not long after
enactment of Rule 702,261 Professor Edward J. Imwinkelried, a recog-
nized authority on evidence law, addressed the issue:
260. See KENNETH S. BROUN, BRANDIS & BROUN ON NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE, § 10
at 30 ("Although the rule as to the function of the judge is frequently stated in broad
terms, it is inapplicable when the relevancy of the proffered evidence depends upon the
existence of some other fact which also requires proof (a situation often labeled
'conditional relevancy'). The determination of the preliminary fact question is then for
the jury."); see also ROBERT P. MOSTELLER, DONALD H. BESKIND, THOMAS W. Ross &
EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS 9 ("[W]here the
admissibility of the evidence depends on showing preliminary facts, as noted in North
Carolina Rule 104(b), the judge decides whether the proponent has provided enough
evidence - viewed most favorably to the proponent - to permit the jury to decide that it
is more probably true than not that the offered exhibit is authentic, or that the lay
witness has firsthand knowledge.").
261. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provided: "If scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise." FED. R. EVID. 702 (1975) (amended 2000). North Carolina adopted the
same language in all material respects in 1981. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-58.13 (1981)
(repealed 1984). The statutory provision was repealed in 1984 when the North
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If the Frye rule is no longer valid, a showing of general acceptance is
no longer necessary; the proponent of the evidence must show only
the preliminary fact of the validity of the underlying scientific theory.
In the parlance of preliminary fact finding, the issue of a theory's valid-
ity is a question of conditional relevance, in which the judge's limited
role is to determine whether, as a matter of law, the proponent has
presented evidence with sufficient probative value to support a rational
jury finding that the fact exists. The jury then determines whether the
fact does exist. Some courts and distinguished commentators agree
that the validity of a scientific principle is a question of conditional
relevance entrusted to the jury's final decision. Even more signifi-
cantly, the Federal Rules of Evidence-rules that have been adopted in
twenty-four states arguably allocate the question to the jury's final
determination.2 6 2
Prof. Imwinkelried saw the requirement for reliability as an authentica-
tion issue:
The [scientific] principle's validity is as essential to the probative value
of scientific evidence as the authenticity of a document is to the docu-
ment's probative worth. The logical relevance doctrine requires valida-
tion of the underlying scientific principle just as it mandates
authentication of a proffered document. The validity of the underlying
principle, therefore, is a preliminary fact that conditions the admissi-
bility of the scientific evidence.
26 3
Rule 901(a), the rule governing authentication, provides: "The
requirement of authentication or identification as a condition prece-
dent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a
finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.
26 4
The illustrations in Rule 901(b) include "[e]vidence describing a pro-
cess or system used to produce a result and showing that the process
or system produces an accurate result. '2 65 Imwinkelried argued that
expert opinion testimony is admissible under the federal rules only if
the proponent can produce evidence sufficient to support the jury
finding that the opinion is grounded in a process (principles or tech-
Carolina Rules of Evidence were adopted but the identical language was carried over to
N.C. R. EVID. 702. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rule 702 (2003).
262. Edward J. Lmwinkelried, Judge Versus Jury: Who Should Decide Questions of
Preliminary Facts Conditioning the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence? 25 WM. AND
MARY L. REV. 577, 579 (1984) (citations omitted).
263. Id. at 598.
264. FED. R. EVID. 901(a); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rule 901(a) (2003). The
North Carolina rule is identical to the federal.
265. FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(9); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rule 901(b)(9) (2003).
The North Carolina rule is identical to the federal.
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niques) or system (methodology) that produces an accurate result.26 6
Like the genuineness of a document, this is a matter of conditional
relevancy under Rule 104(b) where the trial judge determines from the
proponent's foundation evidence whether a reasonable jury could find
the existence of the condition precedent. 267 Like a document that is
not relevant if not genuine, expert testimony is not relevant if not relia-
ble. Reliability, therefore, is the factual predicate upon which the rele-
vancy of the expert's opinion depends.
Professor Imwinkelried ultimately took the position that entrust-
ing the scientific validity or reliability decision to the jury as a matter
of conditional relevancy was not a desirable procedure and recom-
mended amending the Federal Rules of Evidence to assign that task
exclusively to the trial judge.26 8 But he reached that conclusion only
after setting out a detailed and persuasive argument that the structure
of the Federal Rules of Evidence treated reliability of expert opinion as
a matter of conditional relevance.
The language of the rules that compelled Professor Imwinkelried
to conclude scientific validity was a matter of conditional relevancy is
the same language currently in effect in North Carolina. To be clear,
Daubert assigned the reliability determination to the trial judge under
Rule 104(a) and mooted Professor lmwinkelried's argument to amend
the federal rules. But in assigning the trial judge the "gatekeeping"
function under Rule 104(a), the court in Daubert did not address or
analyze the alternative procedural option of treating reliability as an
issue of conditional relevancy. The Supreme Court simply made a pol-
icy choice; a choice it claimed was grounded in the text of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. The Daubert Court found the reliability and rele-
vancy requirements located in Rule 702. "Scientific ... knowledge," as
that term is used in Rule 702, the Court said, implies a "grounding in
the methods and procedures of science."269 Accordingly, the judge
must scrutinize the proffered testimony to determine whether it is suf-
ficiently reliable to meet the "scientific knowledge" requirement of
Rule 702. The relevancy requirement of Daubert comes not from the
general standard of logical relevancy in Rule 401, but from Rule 702's
266. Imwinkelried, supra note 262, at 607-12.
267. See, e.g., State v. Wiggins, 431 S.E.2d 755, 764 (N.C. 1993) ("It was not error
for the trial court to admit the letter if it could reasonably determine that there was
sufficient evidence to support a finding that 'the matter in question is what its
proponent claims.' Defendant then, of course, would have been free to introduce any
competent evidence relevant to the weight or credibility of Moore's testimony.")
(citations omitted).
268. lmwinkelried, supra note 262, at 616.
269. Daubert v. Merrel Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993).
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requirement that the opinion testimony "assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue."27 This com-
bination of substantive requirements imposed on expert opinion testi-
mony by the language of Rule 702 is what necessitated the
"gatekeeping" paradigm imposed in Daubert.
The Howerton court reached its "reliable and relevant" criteria in a
significantly different way. First, relevancy under Howerton comes
from Rule 401's basic relevancy requirement that applies to all evi-
dence.271 The North Carolina Supreme Court did not say that North
Carolina's Rule 702 required a "fit" between the scientific validity of
the opinion and the facts of the case that would require heightened
relevancy analysis like Daubert imposed. Rather, the North Carolina
reliability requirement came from pre-rule case law, minimal as it was,
not the language of Rule 702.272 As noted earlier, that pre-rule case
law was deferential to the testifying expert and, essentially, condi-
tioned admissibility on whether the expert knew more about the sub-
ject matter than the jury.27 3 Furthermore, the language of Rule
901(b)(9) lends textual support to the proposition that opinion testi-
mony derived from some scientific or technical process or system only
requires the proponent to produce evidence sufficient to support a
finding by the jury that the process or system "produces an accurate
result.
27 4
Daubert did not address the applicability of Rule 901(b)(9) to
expert testimony because the Court found the relevance and reliability
requirements in the language of Rule 702. It then implemented those
requirements through the procedural matrix of Rule 104(a). The court
in Howerton, on the other hand, held the relevance of expert testimony
was no different than the relevance requirement imposed on all other
evidence. The relatively low threshold of having "any tendency" to
make the existence of a fact of consequence to the outcome of the case
more or less likely is the same standard applied to all evidence.275 The
straightforward language of Rule 401 cannot carry the burden of
imposing a special "fit" on expert testimony without imposing it on all
other evidence. While one could argue that North Carolina's Rule 702
incorporated the reliability requirement in the rule's "scientific ...
270. Id. at 591 (quoting FED. R. EvID. 702). See supra notes 35-40 and
accompanying text.
271. Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 597 S.E.2d 674, 688 (N.C. 2004).
272. Id. at 686-89.
273. See supra notes 44-190 and accompanying text.
274. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rule 901(b)(9) (2003).
275. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rule 401 (2003).
2005]
41
Woodruff: The Admissibility of Expert Testimony in North Carolina after How
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2005
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
knowledge" language like its federal counterpart, it is equally plausible
that the North Carolina pre-rule reliability requirement was incorpo-
rated into the Rule 901 requirement for authenticity. The fact remains
that the court in Howerton did not specifically identify the locus of the
reliability requirement in the rules but applied criteria that fits nicely
into the authenticity model.276
The arguably different source of the relevant and reliable require-
ments in the North Carolina standard obviously produced a different
substantive test for admissibility. What the court in Howerton failed to
appreciate, though, was whether the different source of the relevant
and reliable requirements, and the resulting different admissibility
standard, warranted a different procedural mechanism as well. While
Howerton rejected the "gatekeeping" role of the trial judge, it failed to
consider alternative procedural options. 277 The doctrine of condi-
tional relevancy as embodied in Rule 104(b), and illustrated by Rule
901(b)(9), provides the procedural mechanism to implement the relia-
bility requirement, especially when the indices of reliability are the
sort of factors that jurors routinely consider when weighing expert
testimony.
B. Determining Reliability Under Rule 104(b) Eases the Burden on
Trial Judges
One assumption underlying assigning the reliability issue to the
court under Rule 104(a) is that judges are better able than jurors to
determine the issue. But as early as 1851 the North Carolina Supreme
Court acknowledged that judges were in no better position than jurors
276. 5 WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 901.1213] at 901-101 (2d ed.). In his
treatise on evidence Judge Weinstein implicitly acknowledges FED. R. EVID. 901 (b)(9)'s
textual commitment of the reliability determination to the jury as an authentication
issue, but notes the Daubert Court's holding otherwise:
The utility of Rule 901(b)(9) as a method for qualifying evidence of the
results of a process or system has been undercut by the Supreme Court's
decision in the Daubert case requiring trial courts to weigh the reliability of
expert testimony prior to admitting it into evidence and the amendments to
Rule 702 implementing that decision. Rule 702 [as amended in December
20001 requires the trial court to make its determination about the reliability
of expert evidence, which is essentially the same determination required
under Rule 901(b)(9), on a preponderance of the evidence, rather than on
the basis of a prima facie showing, which is generally the applicable standard
under Rule 901.
277. Howerton, 597 S.E.2d at 690 ("[W]e are unwilling to impose upon ... [trial
judges] an obligation to expend the human resources required to delve into complex
scientific and technical issues at the level of understanding necessary to generate with
any meaningfulness the conclusions required under Daubert.").
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to resolve the competing and complex issues often present in scientific
testimony. 278 Thus, qualified experts were able to give their opinions
if they knew more about the subject matter than the jury and the testi-
mony would aid the jury in deciding the case. Trial judges merely
determined whether the expert was qualified in his or her respective
field; the validity and reliability of the testimony was left to the jurors
to analyze and use as they saw fit.27 9 While scientific knowledge and
complexity have certainly increased since 1851, there is no reason to
think the relative ability gap between jurors and judges has widened to
the point that judges are now better able than jurors to resolve the
complexities of modern scientific evidence. One of the justifications
for the Frye general acceptance standard was precisely that: neither
judges nor jurors are capable of resolving disputed scientific questions
so the matter is left to the appropriate scientific community. While
often couched in the context of the Frye standard versus the Daubert
standard, many judges and commentators have expressed the diffi-
culty, if not the futility, of placing the reliability determination with the
trial judge. 2 ' Howerton criticized Daubert's gatekeeping approach
precisely because "it places trial courts in the onerous and impractical
position of passing judgment on the substantive merits of the scientific
or technical theories undergirding an expert's opinion.'' 28 1 But
"gatekeeping" has a procedural aspect as well as a substantive test.
Proponents of the "gatekeeping" role of the judge may argue that
while the judge may not be any better qualified than the jury to make
the reliability determination, the judge can become better equipped to
make the decision. For example, the judge is not bound by the rules of
evidence and can research, read, and ponder scientific and technical
literature that would not be available to the jury. The court could
appoint its own expert to review and advise the court on the matter.
Law clerks can be assigned to research, gather, and brief materials ger-
mane to the decision.282 Finally, the accumulated experience the
278. See State v. Clark, 34 N.C. 151, 153 (1 Ired. 1851) ("[P]erson[s] of ordinary
avocations, including jurors and judges, are not generally capable of judging correctly
upon many questions which must be determined in order to the decision of a legal
controversy, and which depend upon scientific knowledge or skill in art .... ).
279. Bullard even alluded to the jury's role in assessing reliability. State v. Bullard,
322 S.E.2d 370, 385 (N.C. 1984) ("The reliability and credibility of Dr. Robbins's
opinion were subject to refutation, and the weight of her testimony was fairly
presented to the jury.").
280. Howerton, 597 S.E.2d at 690-91 (citations omitted).
281. Id. at 690.
282. Unlike federal judges, state trial judges in North Carolina do not have law
clerks. It is conceivable, though perhaps highly unlikely, that at some point in the
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judge gains over time by dealing with these issues will increase the
efficiency of the court in deciding reliability as a preliminary matter
under Rule 104(a). But this process seems to be the "onerous and im-
practical position" Howerton sought to avoid by rejecting Daubert.2 3
By imposing a less rigorous standard of reliability, Howerton
moved closer toward its stated goal of easing the judges' burden. Thus,
it may be argued that a change in procedure is not necessary and the
matter may be properly left as a Rule 104(a) issue. But changing the
"indices of reliability" and lowering the standard of reliability without
altering the procedure still leaves the judge in a "gatekeeping" role.
Admittedly, the gate is now much wider and the gatekeeping function
far less onerous, but as others have commented, "almost anything" will
now be admitted.284 By assigning the reliability question to the jury
under Rule 104(b) and instructing the jury on its obligation to deter-
mine reliability before using the evidence to decide the case, the collec-
tive wisdom of the jury is applied through the deliberation process. In
this setting, twelve heads may be better than one. Furthermore, the
opponent of the evidence gets the opportunity to present evidence of
unreliability to the jury, ask the judge to instruct the jury on its role in
determining reliability, and to argue the expert opinion is too unrelia-
ble for use in deliberations.285
C. Determining Reliability Under Rule 104(b) Respects Juror
Competence
The factors relied upon by North Carolina courts in evaluating the
admissibility of expert testimony are particularly suited to treating the
reliability issue as one of conditional relevancy. When novel scientific
theories, new techniques, new perspectives on established theories, or
new methodologies underlie the proffered opinion, reliability becomes
a foundational element. 286 Drawing upon years of precedent, the
future law clerks may be authorized at the trial court level or that law students could
perform the same function as part of a law school externship program.
283. Howerton, 597 S.E.2d at 690.
284. John M. Conley & Scott W. Gaylord, We Are Not a Daubert State - But What Are
We? Scientific Evidence in North Carolina after Howerton, 6 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 289, 304
(2005).
285. Even under the Daubert procedure lawyers are free to argue the credibility of
expert testimony. Under a Rule 104(b) procedure, however, they can ask the judge to
instruct the jury on its role in determining reliability. See infra note 348 for a
suggested instruction.
286. See Howerton, 597 S.E.2d at 687. Those areas of scientific inquiry determined
to be reliable or unreliable as a matter of law pose little difficulty. "[W]hen specific
precedent justifies recognition of an established scientific theory or technique
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court in Howerton set out four "nonexclusive indices" of reliability: (1)
the expert's use of established techniques; (2) the expert's professional
background in the field; (3) the use of visual aids before the jury; and
(4) independent research conducted by the expert. 28 7 Two of the four
indices, professional background and independent research, are
important elements in determining whether the witness is a qualified
expert in the first place. The language of Rule 104(a) makes that deci-
sion one for the judge, 288 but those factors also go to the weight of any
testimony given by the witness. If the judge determines reliability
under Rule 104(a) and admits the evidence, the jury will evaluate these
same factors in weighing the testimony. 2 9 Thus, these factors are not
so complex or technical that juries cannot properly evaluate and apply
them to the reliability question in the first instance.29 °
The other two factors, the use of established techniques and the
use of visual aids to explain the opinion, are more directly related to
reliability than qualifications. They also support the jury's role in
determining whether the proffered opinion is reliable. Some commen-
tators have questioned the value of the use of visual aids as an indica-
tor of reliability.291 Illustrative exhibits, in and of themselves, do not
enhance reliability. Furthermore, if the objection to proffered expert
advanced by an expert, the trial court should favor its admissibility ...." If a given
discipline has been determined by precedent to be unreliable, like polygraph evidence,
the admissibility decision is treated as a matter of law and the evidence is excluded.
"[Slcientific theories and techniques that have been recognized by this Court as
inherently unreliable" are inadmissible. Id.
287. Id.
288. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rule 104(a) (2003) ("Preliminary questions
concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness ... shall be determined by the
court ....").
289. N.C. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS- CRIM. 104.94 (1970); N.C. PATTERN JURY
INSTRUCTIONs-CIvIL. 101.25 (1999).
290. In those cases where judicial notice is not appropriate to answer the reliability
question, the court must determine the existence vel non of the "indices of reliability"
through the testimony of qualified experts. This becomes a basic credibility test.
While judges are not bound by the rules of evidence if Rule 104(a) governs the matter
and they could resort to affidavits, depositions, and even unsworn statements, it is
difficult to see how such an important decision, grounded squarely on the credibility
of experts, could be made without taking testimony from the experts. If testimony is
required and credibility is the basis of determining whether the indices of reliability
are met,judges are no better than jurors in assessing credibility. See infra notes 307-14
and accompanying text.
291. John M. Conley & Scott W. Gaylord, We Are Not a Daubert State - But What Are
We? Scientific Evidence in North Carolina After Howerton, 6 N.C. J. L & TECH. 289, 296
(2005) ("[T]he use of visual aids is difficult to understand as an indicator of reliability.
Does something become more reliable if you put it on a PowerPoint slide?").
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testimony is made pre-trial there may not be any visual aids to examine
because the expert has not yet testified.292 The inclusion of visual aids
as an indicator of reliability only makes sense if the jury, who will see
the visual aids when the testimony is presented at trial, is charged with
determining reliability as a matter of conditional relevancy under Rule
104(b).
Appropriately used, illustrative exhibits will help the jury under-
stand the techniques employed and how those techniques produced
the opinion being offered. Depending upon the case, real evidence
may also be used as a visual aid. For example, the broken hydraulic
line that allegedly caused the brakes of a car to fail, the bullet removed
from the victim's body and a bullet test fired from a gun found in the
defendant's possession, or the tire that blew out and caused the plain-
tiff to lose control of his car, can all be used to illustrate or explain
various scientific techniques or principles and their application in the
case at hand. All of these items may be helpful in explaining to the
jury how and why the expert reached his opinion, but none may be
present when the issue is litigated at a pre-trial hearing.293 As an indi-
cator of reliability, the use of visual aids to explain the testimony only
makes sense if the judge is performing a screening role under Rule
104(b) and deciding whether the proponent has offered evidence suffi-
cient to support a finding that the proffered opinion is reliable, rather
than making the reliability finding himself under Rule 104(a).
Whether a given technique relied upon by the expert is an estab-
lished technique is a matter of proof that hinges upon credibility.
Judges are not inherently better equipped than jurors to make that
determination. In fact, juries in North Carolina are routinely
instructed that they are the sole judges of credibility.294 For example,
if the contested issue turns out to be whether the technique is estab-
lished, jurors are just as capable as judges to determine that question
based on admissible evidence produced by the parties. Under Rule
104(b), the proponent would have to present evidence that the tech-
nique is established, but the opponent could offer counter evidence.
Resolving these factual discrepancies is what juries are routinely called
292. "Indices of reliability" are fine criteria for appellate courts to use in reviewing
the decisions of trial judges. But admissibility standards must be useable and
appropriate for application by the lawyers and the judge at trial.
293. See Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 597 S.E.2d 674, 679 (N.C. 2004). The trial
judge did not take testimony on the reliability issue. Instead, he "conducted a brief
hearing on the matter, considering arguments from counsel, discovery materials, and
pleadings." Id.
294. N.C. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTION -CIVIL 101.15 (1999); N.C. PATTERN JURY
INSTRUCTION-CRIMINAL 101.15 (1970).
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to do. Assigning the reliability determination to the judge out of fear
that a jury would be unable to weigh and assess the competing claims
raises issues beyond the admissibility of expert testimony; it amounts
to an expression of distrust in the jury system as a whole. As the fol-
lowing section addresses, these fears are unfounded.
D. Determining Reliability Under Rule 104(b) is Supported by Jury
Research
Related to the claim that judges are better qualified and equipped
to decide reliability under the less rigorous North Carolina standard is
the notion that juries are overly impressed and unduly influenced by
scientific and technical evidence. One commentator suggests that "if
the jury were exposed to the foundational testimony of the scientific
evidence and found the evidence technically inadmissible, there would
be a grave risk that the foundational testimony would nevertheless dis-
tort their subsequent deliberations. '2 95 There is also the fear that "the
overtly probabilistic nature of the foundational testimony for scientific
evidence increases the risk that the jurors would be unable to set aside
the testimony during their deliberations even if at a conscious level
they decided that the evidence was technically inadmissible. 296
These arguments assume the foundational testimony as to reliabil-
ity would be presented under a Daubert-type standard, not the less
rigorous, but more jury compatible, "indices of reliability" standard set
out in Howerton. But the question remains, can the jury disregard
expert testimony it finds unreliable? Available social science research
suggests it can.
The classic and most comprehensive study of the American jury is
the Chicago Law School Jury Project conducted in the mid-1950s. 297
Professors Kalven and Zeisel analyzed the outcomes of 3,576 jury tri-
als based upon extensive questionnaires completed by trial judges to
determine the extent of, and reasons for, differences in verdict results
between judges and juries in criminal cases. 29" All cases were tried to
jury verdict and the questionnaires asked each judge, among other
things, whether he would have rendered a different verdict. 299 The
295. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Trial Judges- Gatekeepers or Usurpers? Can the Trial
Judge Critically Assess the Admissibility of Expert Testimony Without Invading the Jury's
Province to Evaluate the Credibility and Weight of the Testimony?, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 13
(2000).
296. Id. at 14.
297. HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966).
298. Id. at 10.
299. Id.
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researchers found the judge and jury in agreement in 75.4% of the
cases.
30 0
Of course, a 75% agreement rate means 25% of the time the judge
and jury reached different conclusions in the same case. If the judge
was "right" in those cases where he disagreed with the jury, it would
lend some objective support to the argument that juries may be less
capable than judges in evaluating facts, understanding the law, and
applying the law to the facts. The researchers hypothesized that "if the
jury has any propensity to misunderstand the case, it will be more likely
to disagree with the judge in those cases it perceives as difficult."30 1
Analysis of the data, however, resulted in "a stunning refutation of the
hypothesis. ' 30 2 This analysis revealed "virtually no difference between
the frequency of disagreement when the case is easy and when the case
is difficult .... -3o Furthermore, in only one of the 894 cases where
the judge and jury disagreed did the judge himself attribute the disa-
greement to the jury's inability to understand or follow the evi-
dence.30 4 The researchers concluded that "contrary to an often voiced
suspicion, the jury does by and large understand the facts and get the
case straight . . . [and] the jury's decision by and large moves with the
weight and direction of the evidence. ' 30 5
Equally revealing is the Jury Project's conclusion on the relative
ability of judges and juries in assessing credibility of witnesses. This
point is particularly important in a post-Howerton world where the
indices of reliability of expert testimony are grounded upon the credi-
bility of the testifying expert. The Jury Project considered whether the
rate of disagreement between judges and juries could be attributed to a
"gullibility of the jury" factor.30 6 The study found neither the judge
nor the jury "distinctively gullible or skeptical. ' 30 7 The credibility gap,
if any, between judge and jury seemed more centered on a particular
type of witness: the criminal defendant with no prior record. 30 8 Juries
300. Id. at 56-58. Of the cases surveyed, 5.5% ended in a hung jury, with 1.1%
leaning toward acquittal and 4.4% leaning toward conviction. When the study's
authors considered a hung jury "half an acquittal," and distributed those cases
accordingly, the judge-jury agreement rate rose to 78%.
301. Id. at 157 (emphasis added).
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 153.
305. Id. at 149.
306. Id. at 168.
307. Id. at 180.
308. Id. at 178.
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seemed to believe this type of witness more often than judges did.30 9
The study concluded this may be the jury conscientiously applying the
reasonable doubt standard.310 While the Chicago Law School Jury
Project focused mainly on criminal trials, a companion study consid-
ered the same questions in the civil trial context.3 1' Not surprisingly,
the data from the civil trials matched that from the criminal trials
almost exactly.312
While the results of the Jury Project may give us confidence in the
jury system as a whole, in the context of assigning expert testimony
reliability determinations to the jury under Rule 104(b), we still must
account for the fact the evidence heard by the jury was screened by the
judge and the jury only evaluated information the court determined
was admissible. Thus, the judge and the jury were really not deciding
the same case. If the additional facts known only to the judge were
known by the jury, would the incidence of disagreement been greater?
Who is better at disregarding inadmissible evidence, the judge or the
jury? Without interviewing every jury and sharing the additional
information with them, it would be impossible to know. But asking
judges to explain why they reached different conclusions does shed
light on this important question. The Jury Project researchers identi-
fied cases in which judges themselves attributed the reason for their
disagreement with the jury to information possessed by the judge but
unknown to the jury.3 13 In other words, judges actually relied upon
otherwise inadmissible information to justify why they would have
reached a verdict different from that reached by the jury in the case
where they denied this information to the jury. While this category of
cases amounted to only 2% of the disagreement cases, it does show
that judges may be no more capable than juries when it comes to disre-
garding information inappropriate for consideration.31 4
Subsequent studies have confirmed the Jury Project's findings and
conclusions and refined the data even further.3 15 In a comprehensive
309. Id.
310. Id. at 181.
311. See Harry Kalven, Jr., The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REV. 1055 (1964)
(reviewing data from Jury Project's survey of civil jury trials).
312. Id. at 63-65. The incidence of judge-jury agreement in civil cases was 78%, the
exact figure found in criminal cases when hung juries were taken into account.
313. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 297 at 121-33.
314. Id. at 121 n.1.
315. See Theodore Eisenberg, Paula L. Hannaford-Agor, Valerie P. Hans, Nicole L.
Mott, G. Thomas Munsterman, Stewart J. Schwab, & Martin T. Wells, Judge-Jury
Agreement in Criminal Cases: A Partial Replication of Kalven & Zeisel's THE AMERICAN
JURY, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 171 (2005).
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review of empirical research on what juries do and how well they do it,
Duke University law professor Neil Vidmar concluded:
Research findings bearing on the performance of civil juries yield little
support for the extreme claims charging juries with poor and irrespon-
sible performance. Trial judges agree with jury decisions most of the
time and strongly support the jury system .... [Tihere is no evidence to
support the claim that juries decide [negligence] cases less compe-
tently than judges and some reason to suspect that the combined judg-
ments of jurors, enhanced through the deliberation process, may be as
good or better than those that would be rendered by a randomly
selected judge. Juries in medical malpractice trials ... tend to render
decisions that are consistent with independent assessments of health
care providers.
3 16
Similarly, studies aimed specifically at evaluating jury compe-
tence in handling expert testimony soundly refute the notion that
juries are unduly influenced by expert testimony. For example, one
survey of jurors in civil jury trials with expert testimony found:
Jurors use criteria as rational and practicable as those suggested for
use by trial judges in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. to
assess the admissibility of scientific evidence. Indeed, when consid-
ered in light of doubts about the abilities of trial judges to apply
Daubert, past research that finds that jurors tend to decide cases con-
sistently with judges and an anecdotal collection of claims of error
made by judges in admitting scientific evidence, juries may be as dis-
cerning as the judges who are charged with shielding them from cer-
tain expert testimony.3 17
Perhaps the best explanation of why jurors perform as well or bet-
ter than judges when dealing with complicated expert testimony lies
with the dynamics of the jury deliberation process. Unlike a trial
judge who must hear, remember, and evaluate the scientific evidence
alone, the jury has the advantage of collective assessment. As one
316. Neil Vidmar, The Performance of the American Civil Jury: An Empirical
Perspective, 40 ARIz. L. REv. 849, 898 (1998); see also VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR,
JUDGING THE JURY 245 (1986) ("Critics have charged that the jury falls short on three
main grounds: it is incompetent, it is prejudiced, and it wages war with the law.
However, when hard facts rather than anecdote and opinion are considered, the
charges do not appear warranted.").
317. Daniel W. Shuman, Anthony Champagne & Elizabeth Whitaker, Assessing the
Believability of Expert Witnesses: Science in the Jurybox, 37 JURIMETRICS J. 23, 30-31
(1996) (citation omitted); see also Craig Lee Montz, Trial Judges as Scientific
Gatekeepers After Daubert, Joiner, Khumo Tire, and Amended Rule 702: Is Anyone Still
Seriously Buying This?, 33 UWLA L. Rev. 87 (2001) (arguing that Frye is a superior test
for admitting scientific evidence because judges are not competent to perform the
analysis Daubert requires).
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study revealed, "[P]ooling the collective wisdom of six or twelve citi-
zens in group deliberation, the jury reduces the chance that factual
misunderstandings will lead to faulty verdicts.
3 18
In 2001, Professors Vidmar and Diamond reviewed over thirty
studies evaluating various aspects of jury handling of complex or
expert testimony and concluded:
It seems clear from this review that claims about jury incompetence
and irresponsibility in assessing and considering the testimony of sci-
entific experts are not supported by research findings. There is consis-
tent convergence in juror interview studies and experimental studies
involving both civil and criminal juries. Jurors appear motivated to
critically assess the content of the expert's testimony and weigh it...
as they are instructed .... [RIather than simply deferring automati-
cally to experts, as critics have claimed, the trial process appears to
make them aware of the fallibility of expert testimony .... [T]he delib-
eration process appears to result in closer examination of diverging
views and understanding-just as the legal system assumes it does.3 19
Equally important, the Vidmar and Diamond review found the
assumption that judges are better at evaluating expert testimony than
jurors "empirically unsupported," and noted that "in complicated
fields like DNA, epidemiology, or chemistry, judges are also
laypersons. "320
The jury research literature refutes the oft-heard criticism that
juries are incompetent or incapable of handling difficult or complex
issues or that judges can put aside inappropriate information more
easily than juries when deciding cases. Thus, recognizing the reliabil-
ity of expert testimony as a matter of conditional relevancy does not
raise the specter of runaway juries and incompetent verdicts. On the
other hand, the apparent similarity between the judges' and juries'
inability to put aside inappropriate information when deciding cases
could be argued to support leaving the reliability determination with
the judge under Rule 104(a). If the judge excluded the evidence, the
argument goes, the jury would never hear it and there would be no risk
of contaminating the jury's verdict with an opinion the jury found
unreliable but could not put out of its collective mind during
deliberations.
318. Daniel W. Shuman, Elizabeth Whitaker, & Anthony Champagne, An Empirical
Examination of the Use of Expert Witnesses in the Courts-Part II: A Three City Study, 34
JURIMETRICS J. 193, 198-99 (1994).
319. Neil Vidmar & Shari Seidman Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66 BROOK.
L. REv. 1121, 1174 (2001).
320. Id. at 1167-69.
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This argument not only ignores the language of the rules of evi-
dence, it is inconsistent with established practice in analogous areas.
For example, Rule 404(b) allows evidence of prior misconduct when
offered for some purpose other than to prove the actor's propensity to
behave in a certain way.321 In Huddleston v. United States, the defen-
dant was tried for selling stolen blank videotapes. 322 The only issue at
trial was whether Huddleston knew the tapes were stolen when he sold
them.323 To prove he knew the tapes were stolen, the United States
offered evidence that on a prior occasion Huddleston sold stolen tele-
visions he got from the same man who gave him the videotapes.324
Huddleston claimed he did not know the televisions or the videotapes
were stolen.325 The Court noted the sale of the televisions was only
relevant to Huddleston's knowledge that the tapes were stolen if the
televisions were, in fact, stolen.326 If the televisions were stolen, then
his involvement with the televisions would be probative of his knowl-
edge of the stolen character of the videotapes he got from the same
source. 32 7 Huddleston claimed the stolen character of the televisions
was a preliminary fact to be decided by the judge under Rule 104(a)
and the trial judge erred by allowing the jury to determine the issue
under Rule 104(b).328
The Supreme Court affirmed the trial judge's ruling. 9 In a
unanimous opinion, the Court agreed the relevance of the sale of sto-
len televisions to Huddleston's knowledge of the stolen character of the
tapes was conditioned upon the fact the televisions were indeed sto-
len.330 Accordingly, the language of the rules assigned the matter to
the jury under Rule 104(b). The trial judge merely screens the founda-
tion evidence offered by the prosecution to see if the jury could find by
321. See also FED. R. EVID. 404(b); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rule 404(b) (2003)
("Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake, entrapment or
accident.").
322. 485 U.S. 681, 682 (1988).
323. Id. at 683.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 684.
326. Id. at 686.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 686-87.
329. Id. at 692.
330. Id. at 686.
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a preponderance of the evidence the televisions were stolen. In con-
ducting this screening under Rule 404(b):
[Tihe trial court neither weighs credibility nor makes a finding that the
Government has proved the conditional fact by a preponderance of the
evidence. The court simply examines all the evidence in the case and
decides whether the jury could reasonably find the conditional fact-
here, that the televisions were stolen-by a preponderance of the
evidence.33
In addressing Huddleston's argument that exposing the jury to
evidence of prior misconduct, without requiring a preliminary finding
by the trial judge that the misconduct actually occurred, exposed him
to unfair prejudice, the Court noted the limited purpose of the evi-
dence, the relevancy requirement enforced through Rule 104(b), and
the balancing test of Rule 403 all combined to protect him from unfair
prejudice.332
In the context of whether reliability of expert testimony is a matter
of conditional relevancy, the essential point of Huddleston is that the
jury is entirely capable of hearing evidence of a criminal defendant's
involvement in a prior offense, determining whether the defendant was
actually involved in the prior act, and then either disregarding the evi-
dence or considering it for its offered purpose depending upon how it
resolved the conditional fact.333 The Court was comfortable with the
jury's ability to disregard potentially prejudicial, evidence if it found
the preliminary fact upon which the relevancy of the evidence was con-
ditioned did not exist.33 4
North Carolina has adopted Huddleston and applies conditional
relevancy to similar acts under Rule 404(b). 335 Furthermore, the exis-
tence of and the defendant's participation in a conspiracy are facts
upon which the relevancy of a co-conspirator's statement is condi-
tioned. Before a co-conspirator's statement may be offered against the
accused, "the state must produce sufficient evidence to authorize the
jury to find that a conspiracy existed. ' 336 Thus, the North Carolina
331. Id. at 690.
332. Id. at 691.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. See State v. Stager, 406 S.E.2d 876, 890 (N.C. 1991) ("We find the reasoning of
Huddleston compelling and conclude that evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b)...
if it is substantial evidence tending to support a reasonable finding by the jury that the
defendant committed a similar act or crime and its probative value is not limited solely
to tending to establish the defendant's propensity to commit a crime such as the crime
charged."); see also State v. Moore, 440 S.E.2d 797, 813 (N.C. 1994).
336. State v. Nichols, 365 S.E.2d 561, 570 (N.C. 1988).
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Supreme Court, like the Supreme Court of the United States, is confi-
dent that juries can hear potentially prejudicial evidence, evaluate
whether the predicate facts upon which the relevancy of the evidence
depends actually exist, and disregard the information if it determines
the predicate facts are not supported by the greater weight of the evi-
dence. Fears of jury incompetence, lack of jury sophistication, or the
claim that juries are unduly influenced by experts and could not
ignore unreliable opinions are simply not supported by the growing
body of social science research data and cannot justify assigning the
reliability determination of expert testimony to the judge as a prelimi-
nary matter under Rule 104(a).
E. Determining Reliability Under Rule 104(b) Levels the Playing Field
The Howerton court expressed specific concern that the Rule
104(a) procedure used under Daubert to determine the reliability of
expert testimony conferred an unfair advantage on the opponent of
expert testimony.337 The judge, who is not bound by the rules of evi-
dence, resolves conflicting facts over the reliability of proffered testi-
mony. The proponent of the testimony, as the non-moving party in the
motion to exclude, has the burden of establishing reliability, but the
decision maker does not have to view the evidence in a light favorable
to the non-moving party. Factual conflicts over reliability often boil
down to basic credibility decisions the judge must resolve. Unlike a
motion for summary judgment, the presence of a genuine dispute over
a material issue of fact does not preclude the judge from granting the
motion to exclude testimony. If the court finds the proponent of the
testimony has not established the reliability of the expert opinion to
the court's satisfaction, the evidence is excluded and summary judg-
ment often follows. When the court's fact-bound and credibility-based
decision is then appealed, the deferential standard of review of abuse
of discretion almost guarantees an affirmance. 33" Thus, under the
Daubert-endorsed Rule 104(a) procedure, opponents of expert testi-
mony can exclude the testimony and win summary judgment even
337. See Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 597 S.E.2d 674, 692 (N.C. 2004). In federal
court, the foundation for admission of a co-conspirator's statement is a preliminary
matter for the court under Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) and the preponderance
standard applies. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987).
338. One analysis of affirmance rates throughout the federal system since 2000 put
the affirmance rate for cases excluding expert testimony at 84.9%, the affirmance rate
for cases admitting expert testimony at 88.3%, for a total affirmance rate of 86.8%.
Daubert on the Web, http://www.daubertontheweb.com/circuits.htm (last visited
Sept. 30, 2005).
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when material facts are in genuine dispute. This procedural advantage
places a premium on motions to exclude expert testimony and has
made the "Daubert hearing" a staple of civil litigation.
Importantly, the advantage bestowed on the opponent of the evi-
dence is a product of the procedure, not the substantive standard. By
imposing a less rigorous reliability standard, Howerton arguably
reduced the possibility that judges will exclude expert testimony and
grant summary judgment to the opponent of that testimony. But
rejecting the Daubert standard while keeping the Daubert procedural
paradigm does not address the fundamental source of the inequity.
Rule 104(a) allows the judge to resolve factual disputes, weigh the evi-
dence, assess the credibility of witnesses, and use otherwise inadmissi-
ble evidence to determine whether to admit expert testimony. If the
court does exclude expert testimony and grant summary judgment to
the opponent of the expert testimony the procedural unfairness that so
disturbed the court in Howerton will still be present.339 Under the
Howerton indices of reliability, the exclusion and subsequent grant of
summary judgment would be even more unfair because the criteria the
judge will use is the same criteria the jury would use to weigh the
evidence on the merits. Instead of having twelve citizens decide facts
essential to the case, the Daubert procedure assigns that task exclu-
sively to the trial judge. Thus, the retention of the Daubert procedure
exacerbates the unfairness issue.
When reliability is treated as a matter of conditional relevancy
under Rule 104(b), however, the procedural advantages to the oppo-
nent disappear. The judge no longer resolves material factual disputes
or decides which expert is more credible. Instead, the judge performs
the more traditional function of deciding whether the evidence of relia-
bility is sufficient to support a finding. If so, the resolution of any
factual dispute over reliability, the assessment of the witness's credibil-
ity, and the weight to accord the reliability evidence is left to the jury.
Furthermore, because the jury is acting as the fact finder, the rules of
evidence will govern the admissibility of the foundational evidence of
reliability and will tend to make that evidence more reliable.34 °
Because expert testimony has become such an integral part of the
modern jury trial, many causes of action, charges, and damage claims
339. See, e.g., Howerton, 597 S.E.2d at 694-95 (Parker, J., dissenting) (stating that
the court should affirm trial court's grant of summary judgment because trial court
properly excluded plaintiffs experts under the North Carolina standard for reliability).
340. See, e.g., STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, MICHAEL M. MARTIN, & DANIEL J. CAPRA, 4
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL § 801.02[1][a] at 801-12 (2002) ("The hearsay
rule is designed to exclude a certain type of unreliable evidence.").
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require expert opinion to support them. Absent expert testimony to
support a cause, charge, or claim, the matter is resolved against the
party with the burden of proof and the jury never gets to hear the case.
A major criticism of Daubert is that it disposes of cases that should be
decided by juries. The Howerton court was concerned the Daubert
approach "may unnecessarily encroach upon the constitutionally-man-
dated function of the jury to decide issues of fact and to assess the
weight of the evidence."' 34 ' Treating reliability as a matter of condi-
tional relevancy under Rule 104(b) and applying North Carolina's indi-
ces of reliability eliminates that concern without sacrificing accuracy
or efficiency.
F. Determining Reliability Under Rule 104(b) Does Not Open the
Door to "Junk Science"
Some argue that assigning the reliability question to the jury
under Rule 104(b) will allow unreliable opinion testimony to infect the
fact-finding process. 342 The North Carolina Rules of Evidence, how-
ever, give sufficient power to the trial judge to exclude "junk science"
or other opinions that are not supported by credible evidence of
reliability.
First, under Rule 104(b) the court must evaluate the evidence sup-
porting reliability to determine whether it is sufficient to permit the
jury to find by the greater weight of the evidence that the proffered
opinion is reliable.343 When evidence of reliability is absent or is
incredible as a matter of law, the judge has the obligation to exclude it.
Furthermore, the court must take judicial notice of those techniques
or methods that have been found to be unreliable as a matter of law
and exclude opinion based on those methods.344
Second, if the evidence of reliability passes the sufficiency test of
Rule 104(b) but is still suspect, Rule 403 provides a familiar mecha-
nism for the court to evaluate the evidence and exclude evidence with
doubtful reliability.345 In determining the probative value of the prof-
fered opinion evidence under the Rule 403 balancing test, the judge
341. Howerton, 594 S.E.2d at 692.
342. See Imwinkelried, supra note 262, at 581; see also text accompanying notes 298-
321 for a discussion of the ability of the jury to resolve conflicting testimony over
reliability and the ability to disregard opinion testimony it finds unreliable.
343. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rule 104(b) (2003).
344. See, e.g., Howerton, 597 S.E.2d at 687; State v. Goode, 461 S.E.2d 631, 641
(N.C. 1995).
345. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rule 403 (2003) ("Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of
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considers the reliability of the evidence. This will necessarily require
the court to consider the quality and credibility of the evidence of relia-
bility. Opinion testimony that is not reliable is not probative of the
point it seeks to prove or the inference it suggests should be drawn. As
the overall strength of the reliability evidence goes down, so does the
probative value under Rule 403. Depending upon the issue in the case,
the jury's reliance on suspect or shaky expert opinion, even though it
passed the sufficiency screening by the judge under Rule 104(b), may
reach the point where the danger of unfair prejudice or confusion sub-
stantially outweighs the probative value.
Third, application of the Rule 403 balancing test is the proper
place to consider the "fit" or heightened relevance requirement the
Daubert Court included in the admissibility equation under Rule
104(a). 346 The closer the "fit" between the proffered opinion and the
facts of the case, the greater the probative value. Conversely, the
greater the gap between the opinion and the facts of the case, the lower
the probative value and the greater the risk of unfair prejudice. Apply-
ing the "fit" requirement as part of the Rule 403 balancing test places
the "relevancy" aspect of reliability in its proper perspective and,
because Rule 403 is weighted toward admissibility instead of exclu-
sion, lessens the danger that legitimate factual questions will be
removed from the jury's consideration.
The court in Howerton properly noted the trial judge's power to
exclude evidence under Rule 403. By assigning the basic reliability
determination to the trial judge under Rule 104(a), however, the appli-
cation of Rule 403 is actually subsumed in the Rule 104(a) determina-
tion. It will be an unusual trial judge who is satisfied under Rule
104(a) that proffered expert testimony is reliable and then find it not
reliable enough to survive a Rule 403 challenge. The mental gymnas-
tics required to conduct that sort of evaluation are as burdensome and
onerous as the Daubert approach. If the trial judge merely screens the
reliability evidence for sufficiency, however, he can still approach the
Rule 403 test with a degree of objectivity and detachment that will
facilitate more accurate assessment and balancing of probative value
and prejudicial effect. By separating the sufficiency of the evidence
and the probative value determinations under Rules 104(b) and 403,
respectively, the judge can apply familiar concepts to novel issues in a
clear and structured process. Thus, determining reliability under Rule
104(b) actually facilitates and encourages more accurate and intellec-
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."). FED. R.
EvID. 403 is identical.
346. See supra text accompanying notes 35-40.
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tually honest balancing under Rule 403 than occurs when reliability is
decided by the judge as a preliminary fact under Rule 104(a).
Fourth, the Rule 104(b) procedure offers an additional check
against junk science by instructing the jury on its responsibility under
Rule 104(b) to first determine reliability before considering the merits
of the opinion. Daubert dispenses with this mechanism because of the
rigorous, exacting, and detailed scrutiny applied by the trial judge in
determining reliability in the first instance. Testimony admitted under
the Daubert procedure goes to the jury with an instruction on the
jury's role in deciding weight and credibility.34 7 The jury is not
instructed to consider, question, or resolve conflicting evidence as to
the reliability of the opinion.
Limiting the jury to considering the weight of the opinion in an
overall sense may be appropriate when the evidence has gone through
the exacting scrutiny Daubert requires. The Howerton standard,
though, is far less rigorous and less exacting. Specifically instructing
the jury to consider the reliability of the evidence before considering
its value to the case on the merits draws the jury's attention to this
important aspect of expert testimony and allows the jury to bring its
collective wisdom to bear on the issue.348
347. See, e.g., PATTERN CIV. JURY INSTR. 5TH CIR. § 3.1 (2005) ("When knowledge of
technical subject matter may be helpful to the jury, a person who has special training
or experience in that technical field-he is called an expert witness-is permitted to
state his opinion on those technical matters. However, you are not required to accept
that opinion. As with any other witness, it is up to you to decide whether to rely upon
it. In deciding whether to accept or rely upon the opinion of an expert witness, you
may consider any bias of the witness, including any bias you may infer from evidence
that the expert witness has been or will be paid for reviewing the case and testifying, or
from evidence that he testifies regularly as an expert witness and his income from
such testimony represents a significant portion of his income."); MODEL Civ. JURY
INSTR. 9TH CIR. § 3.7 (2001) ("You have heard testimony from [a] person[s] who,
because of education or experience, [is] [are] permitted to state opinions and the
reasons for those opinions. Opinion testimony should be judged just like any other
testimony. You may accept it or reject it, and give it as much weight as you think it
deserves, considering the witness's education and experience, the reasons given for
the opinion, and all the other evidence in the case.").
348. When reliability of the principles, techniques, methods, or theories is
challenged, or when the application of those principles, techniques, methods, or
theories is challenged, the trial judge should instruct the jury on its role in resolving
the reliability issue substantially as follows:
In this case you have heard evidence from [a witness] [witnesses] who
[has] [have] testified as [an] expert witness[es]. An expert witness is
permitted to testify in the form of an opinion in a field where he purports to
have specialized skill or knowledge.
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G. Determining Reliability Under Rule 104(b) Reduces the Likelihood
of Courts Resorting to a Mechanistic Application of "Indices
of Reliability"
One of the major faults Howerton found with Daubert and its prog-
eny was the tendency of trial courts to apply the Daubert factors in a
mechanistic and rigorous way. 34 9 The Daubert factors became "legal
principles established by the Supreme Court" and reduced, if not elim-
inated, the flexibility needed to determine reliability across the wide
spectrum of expert opinion testimony.3 ° By rejecting Daubert's sub-
stantive test but keeping the Rule 104(a) Daubert procedure, the North
[Omit this paragraph if the trial court finds the underlying methodology is
reliable as a matter of law] In considering the testimony of the [these] expert
witness[es] you should first determine whether the principles, techniques,
methods, or theories relied upon by an expert are reliable. If you find by the
greater weight of the evidence that the principles, techniques, methods, or
theories relied upon by an expert witness are unreliable, you should
disregard the testimony and not consider it in your deliberations. If [on the
other hand] you find by the greater weight of the evidence that the principles,
techniques, methods, or theories are reliable, you should then consider
whether the expert applied those principles, techniques, methods, or theories
correctly and reliably in reaching the opinion[s] given in this case.
You have heard testimony explaining the basis of the expert opinion and
how the witness[es] reached [his] [her] [their] opinion[s]. If you find by the
greater weight of the evidence that [the] [an] expert did not apply the
principles, techniques, methods, or theories of [his] [her] [their] field of
expertise in a reliable manner in reaching the opinion[s] in this case, you
should disregard the opinion[s] and not consider [it] [them] in your
deliberations. If, on the other hand, you find by the greater weight of the
evidence that the expert witness did apply the principles, techniques,
methods, or theories in a reliable manner you should give the opinion[s]
whatever weight you think is appropriate in light of all the other testimony
and facts of the case.
As I have instructed you, you are the sole judges of the credibility of each
witness and the weight to be given to the testimony of each witness. In
making this determination as to the testimony of an expert witness, you
should consider, in addition to the other tests of credibility and weight, the
witness's training, qualifications, and experience or lack thereof; any
independent research the witness may have conducted, the reasons, if any,
given for the opinion; whether the opinion is supported by facts that you find
from the evidence; whether the opinion is reasonable; and whether it is
consistent with other believable evidence in the case. You should consider the
reliable opinion of an expert witness, but you are not bound by it. In other
words, you are not required to accept an expert witness's opinion to the
exclusion of the facts and circumstances disclosed by other testimony.
349. Howerton, 597 S.E.2d at 690.
350. Id. at 691 (quoting David Crump, The Trouble with Daubert-Kumho:
Reconsidering the Supreme Court's Philosophy of Science, 68 Mo. L. REv. 1, 40 (2003)).
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Daubert placed onerous burdens on trial judges, gave opponents of
expert testimony an unfair advantage in winning summary judgment,
and threatened litigants' constitutional right to have their cause deter-
mined by a jury. Merely rejecting the substantive limits of Daubert
does not fully address the Howerton court's concerns. Rejecting
Daubert's substance but keeping its procedure, not to mention the
same language used by Daubert to describe the standard for admissi-
bility, sends the message that North Carolina does not take reliability
standards seriously and juries cannot be trusted to properly evaluate
even those less exacting standards. Furthermore, retaining the Rule
104(a) procedure of Daubert and applying the Howerton factors
instead of the Daubert factors substitutes one mechanistic process for
another and could lead to the same evils Howerton sought to avoid.
Treating the reliability of expert testimony as a matter of condi-
tional relevancy under Rule 104(b) gives lawyers and judges a clear
structure and procedure to follow and allows for more efficient case
preparation and presentation. Furthermore, it is consistent with the
substance and structure of the rules of evidence, gives the trial judge
appropriate standards and controls to exclude "junk science," encour-
ages litigants to make sound tactical and strategic trial decisions
regarding their presentation of reliability evidence, eliminates the
opponent's unfair advantage the court in Howerton found existed
under Daubert, protects litigants' right to a jury determination of their
cases, and expresses confidence in North Carolina juries.
North Carolina never adhered exclusively to the Frye standard of
general acceptance. It has now rejected Daubert, Frye's replacement.
To some extent the Howerton standard avoids the substantive disadvan-
tages of both Frye and Daubert, but retains their procedural disadvan-
tage. While reliability can and should be the touchstone of admissible
expert testimony, assigning that task exclusively to the trial judge
under Rule 104(a) is only a partial solution to the problems identified
by Howerton. Rule 104(b) provides an alternative procedure that is
consistent with the language of the rules of evidence, makes better use
of North Carolina's indices of reliability for expert testimony, and
more completely addresses the Daubert failings identified by the court
in Howerton.
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